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Chapter Six 
 
Vulnerabilities and Older Owners 
 
(1) Introduction 
 
Although there are clear and specific risks associated with home equity transactions for any 
owner (and particularly marginal owners), regardless of age,
1
 the particular tensions between 
competing housing paradigms for older owners emphasise the ways in which their decision-
making concerning use of housing equity is framed by specific contextual factors.
2
  While 
older owners are a widely differentiated population, both in terms of socio-economic 
circumstances and financial and legal capabilities, this chapter considers whether the 
economic, demographic, social, housing preference and risk contexts of housing equity use 
for older owners create specific vulnerabilities which affect their ability to negotiate housing 
equity transactions or the impact of adverse transactions on their wellbeing.  By exploring the 
factors which may render an older owner particularly vulnerable in relation to financial 
transactions affecting their homes, this analysis begins to considers how these vulnerabilities 
map onto the legal concepts that potentially trigger protection for vulnerable populations, and 
to evaluate the appropriate theoretical and practical bases for any legal protections deemed 
necessary in this context.       
 
One area of vulnerability considered in this chapter relates to the decision-making process 
when the older owner enters into a transaction.  Within this category, the most obvious cause 
of vulnerability is impaired capacity, although this is not the only or necessarily the most 
prevalent issue, particularly in light of improved health and wellbeing in (especially early) 
old age.  Another potential type of vulnerability, also falling within this category, relates to 
the impact of age on the ability to make economic decisions, and includes what the FSA have 
termed „financial capability‟ as well as psychological research exploring the impact of age 
per se on healthy older people‟s abilities to make decisions under uncertainty, to think 
strategically and to plan their futures.  These issues are brought into sharp relief by the 
demands on older consumers following the „emancipation from traditional aging‟ 3 which has 
                                                 
1
 See Chapter Three. 
2
 See Chapter Four. 
3
 C Phillipson, Reconstructing Old Age (London: Sage, 1998), p124; see Chapter Two. 
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made later life in the period of late modernity a time of increased choice (and so increased 
risk),
4
 and which is brought into sharp relief by the inherent complexity of financial products 
that release housing equity.
5
   
 
A third source of vulnerability in respect of financial decision-making relates to the risk of 
financial abuse of older owners, either by inappropriate targeting by financial product 
providers, or by family members or carers who exert pressure on the older person to enter 
into particular transactions.  Finally in this category, a fourth cause of vulnerability relating to 
the decision-making process is rooted in the social and economic circumstances or contexts 
of the transaction.  This type of systemic vulnerability stems from the pressures that older 
people are under to make choices which enable them to take individual responsibility for their 
old age, and to engage in effective life planning.  The political and policy contexts have set 
the scene for increasing use of housing equity after retirement, while the tensions between the 
competing housing paradigms highlight the complexities of the choices that must be made.  
This „contextual vulnerability‟ is distinct from considerations of capacity or consent 
inasmuch as it is external to the individual‟s mental abilities or capacities, but does reflect the 
constraints that may shape these choices, particularly for marginal owners.  This in turn 
locates the issue of contextual vulnerability within the realm of inequalities, in both financial 
resources and the social and cultural capitals which play a crucial role in determining the 
„winners‟ and „losers‟ in a risk society.6     
 
The second category of vulnerability considered in this chapter shifts the focus away from the 
„point of sale‟ of home equity transactions, towards the „point of crisis‟, when bad outcomes 
result from decisions taken.  In this context, the issue of vulnerability relates to the 
differential impact of adverse consequences on (certain) older consumers.  In discussing the 
risks of equity release schemes, the Financial Services Authority have recognised that „What 
makes matters worse in this area is that these consumers tend to be elderly and vulnerable 
people who can ill-afford to be unnecessarily exposed to risk.‟7  This meaning of 
                                                 
4
 See Chapter Three. 
5
 See Chapter Three, section 3(b), where it was noted that the FSA‟s 2007 review of products to finance 
retirement emphasised both the complexity of the decisions that older people need to make regarding the 
funding their terms of their old age and the specific complexity of equity release products, so that the detail of 
how the different products work is difficult to understand; see Financial Services Authority, Finance in and at 
retirement – results of our review (London: FSA, 2007); available online at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/retirement_review.pdf.    
6
 See discussion in Chapter One, section 3(b). 
7
 Clive Briault, Managing Director of Retail Markets at the FSA, quoted at 
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vulnerability has also been recognised in the English courts: for example, in R v Waveney DC 
ex parte Bowers,
8
 the Court of Appeal defined vulnerability (for the purposes of „priority 
need‟ for local authority housing) as meaning „less able to fend for oneself so that injury or 
detriment will result where a less vulnerable man will be able to cope without harmful 
effects.‟  The „impact‟ dimension of vulnerability shifts the focus from the older owner‟s 
ability to make choices at the point of sale, to consider how detrimental the consequences of 
choosing badly might be for an older owner, compared for example to a younger person who 
has greater opportunity to absorb risk, adjust to losses and recover from economic setbacks 
by earning more money.
9
  These two dimensions of vulnerability (decision-making and 
impact) also map onto the two dimensions of risk: the probability that the harm will occur 
and the magnitude of associated losses or gains;
10
 while decision-making vulnerability 
captures the likelihood of loss, the impact dimension denotes the value attached to the loss, or 
„the awfulness of getting the wager wrong‟.11 
 
The intersections between vulnerabilities and aging also raise politically and emotionally 
loaded connotations of „dependency‟.  While feminist (and some progressive property)12 
scholarship has attempted to de-bunk the negative connotations of „dependency‟,13 the 
labelling of populations as „dependent‟ continues to carry a political subtext.14  While it is 
recognised that dependency creates vulnerability, and both „dependent‟ and „vulnerable‟ 
subjects depart from the classical „rational subject‟ of neoliberal economics and liberal legal 
theory, the characteristics which are presumed to set them apart as subjects differ 
significantly, with potential implications for claims to legal protection.  Leonard described 
the „dependent subject‟ as a pre-occupation of the New Right critique of the „culture of 
dependency‟: a person who is reliant on state support, and in turn does not engage with the 
reproduction of capitalist social relations, for example, through their reduced ability to 
consume.
15
  Dependent subjects do not display the neoliberal virtues of commitment to work, 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2005/054.shtml  
8
 [1983] QB 238. 
9
 See discussion in Chapter Four, section 3.  
10
 D Lupton, Risk (London: Routledge, 1999), p8.   
11
 See J Steele, Risks and Legal Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), discussing „Pascal‟s wager‟, pp22-23.    
12
 Chapter Four, section 5. 
13
 See for example, MA Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (New York: The New Press, 
2004).     
14
 See discussion below, section 7. 
15
 P Leonard, Postmodern welfare: Reconstructing an Emancipatory Project (London: Sage, 1997), p50.  
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family responsibility and competition, and so attract social and moral opprobrium, which has 
sometimes been reflected in legal discourse.
16
  
 
In other cases, dependency has been equated with vulnerability, and has given rise to 
protections for the older person: for example, a person who is old and homeless will be 
classified as „vulnerable‟, which will usually mean being swiftly re-housed,17 without the 
need to demonstrate incapacity.  Clapham, Kemp and Smith have argued that this reflects the 
construction of older people as „dependent subjects‟, who:  
…have, for the most part, no direct relationship with the labour market [and] can be 
defined as deserving of assistance, in that the provision of state help would not be 
expected to inhibit the qualities of initiative and self-reliance which the undeserving 
homeless (those who could, theoretically compete in the labour market and provide 
for themselves) are deemed to lack.
18
       
The discussion in Chapter Two highlighted the policy narratives which have increasingly 
constructed older people as active and responsible consumers in relation to care, through the 
shift from welfare provision to housing equity use, while the particular emphasis on older 
owners as consumers in the neoliberal environment was noted in Chapter Three.  While age 
has been recognised as a factor which heightens vulnerability in the case of older homeless 
people for the purposes of local authority housing, it is through the lens of dependency, 
which is viewed by older people as an unattractive „label‟, and which casts them, as a 
population group, as „non-subjects‟, in diametric opposition to the „autonomous 
individualism‟ that underpins the construction of older owners in neoliberal governance as 
self-providing consumers.
19
  As the discussion in Chapter Five has indicated, the terms 
„autonomy‟ and „dependence‟ are heavily-loaded with political meanings which have been 
deployed to justify the dominant tropes of self-provision and self-responsibility.  The 
                                                 
16
 See for example, T Ross, „The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness‟ (1991) 79 
Georgetown Law Review 1499. 
17
 D Hawes, Older People and Homelessness (Bristol: Policy Press, 1997), p9.   
18
 D Clapham, P Kemp & S Smith, Housing and Social Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p121; quoted in 
J Morgan, Housing Law (London: Blackstone, 1998), p276.  Morgan goes on to note that „Customarily, people 
at or past retirement age were considered vulnerable on account of old age.  The Code of Guidance suggests that 
authorities should look at whether age has made it hard for the applicant to fend for himself or herself, and that 
all applications [to be housed] from people over 60 should be looked at carefully‟, J Morgan, Housing Law 
(London: Blackstone, 1998), p277. 
19
 The social, economic and political contexts of financing retirement mean that housing equity transactions 
straddle a fluid boundary between private financial transactions executed by homeowners as consumers, and the 
realm of social welfare support for the care, pensions and housing needs of older people.  However, older 
owners are constructed not as „dependent subjects‟ but (despite their „market dependency‟) as „independent‟ and 
self-determining; see Leonard, above, pp53-54.   
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challenges of reconciling the realities of vulnerability within the dominant political 
framework are considered in section 7, below.   
 
The analyses of vulnerabilities in this chapter provide a lens through which to evaluate the 
nature and extent of legal protections for older owners in housing equity transactions.  This in 
turn provides a platform from which to think about the arguments for treating older owners 
(or older consumers) as „vulnerable legal subjects‟.  On the one hand, it has often been argued 
that the extension of „special protections‟ to particular groups should be viewed with caution 
as it may have adverse implications of dependency, lack of capacity and lack of autonomy.
20
  
Fineman‟s concept of the „vulnerable legal subject‟ offers a fresh opportunity to move away 
from the (political) conflation of „autonomous individualism‟ and independence (the 
autonomy/dependence dyad) to „develop a more complex subject around which to build 
social policy and law‟.21  Fineman has argued that this vulnerable subject „must replace the 
autonomous and independent subject asserted in the liberal tradition.‟22  This chapter seeks to 
take a „real measure‟ of the vulnerabilities which (marginal) older owners may face in 
housing equity transactions, and to consider what how these vulnerabilities reflect on older 
owners as legal subjects.  In doing so, the chapter draws on Fineman‟s challenge to the 
normative framework of legal subjectivity to consider its implications for older owners in 
housing equity transactions.  Specifically, the final section considers the critical potential 
offered by the discursive tropes of vulnerability and responsibility when analysing the 
justifications for law‟s outlook on the housing equity transactions of older owners.  
 
(2) Capacity  
 
While capacity provides the obvious starting point for any discussion of older people and 
vulnerability in financial transactions, it is important not to overplay the significance of 
questions of capacity in this context,
23
 or to focus (as legal analysis often does) on 
                                                 
20
 See for example, Green and Lim discussing women entering financial transactions, and arguing against 
special protections on the grounds that: “[w]e do not want always to be victims.”; K Green & H Lim, „Weaving 
Along the Borders: Public and Private, Women and Banks‟, in S Scott-Hunt & H Lim (eds) Feminist 
Perspectives on Equity and Trusts (London, Cavendish, 2001), p98.   
21
 MA Fineman, „The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition‟ (2008) 20 Yale Journal 
of Law and Feminism 1. 
22
 Ibid, at 2. 
23
 78% of those aged 85 and older have no cognitive impairment at all; T Poole, Housing Options for Older 
People (King‟s Fund, 2005), at 2; cited in J Herring, Older People in Law and Society, (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 
p52. 
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(in)capacity to the exclusion of other forms of vulnerability.
24
  Nevertheless, questions of 
capacity do arise, and so this section considers the impact of the current law in this context.  
The law on capacity in England and Wales is currently set out in the Mental Capacity Act 
2005, which sets out the default position, that a person is assumed to have capacity unless it 
is established that they do not, and that „A person is not to be treated as unable to make a 
decision merely because he makes an unwise decision.‟25  The Act goes on to provide that a 
person is mentally incapable if he is „unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the 
matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or 
brain.‟26  In these circumstances, the legislation empowers the court to make a declaration of 
incapacity and then either make an order through which the court makes the decision on the 
incapable person‟s behalf, or authorise another person to make decisions on his or her 
behalf.
27
   
 
Although reference is made to age in this Act, it is only in the negative sense that section 
2(3)(a) prohibits establishing lack of capacity merely by reference to a person‟s age.  The 
criteria by which the inability to make a decision is judged are set out in section 3, and 
include: the ability to understand information relevant to decision; the ability to retain that 
information; the ability to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the 
decision; and the ability to communicate the decision.  It is interesting to note that section 
3(4) provides that „The information relevant to a decision includes information about the 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of (a) deciding one way or another, or (b) failing to 
make the decision.‟28  In light of their unknown future needs, housing equity transactions may 
well have unforeseeable adverse consequences for older owners.
29
  However, the capacity 
legislation clearly does not extend to difficulties in making decisions that result from the 
                                                 
24
 See for example, the Report of the Irish Law Commission on „Vulnerable Adults and the Law‟ (LRC 83-
2006), available online at http://lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/Report%20Vulnerable%20Adults.pdf which 
focused almost entirely on issues relating to capacity.  Although the Consultation Paper preceding this report 
dedicated a full chapter to protections against financial abuse of vulnerable elders and abuse in property 
transactions [Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Law and the Elderly (LRC CP 23-2003)], this 
was addressed in four pages of the final report, which made only one recommendation: that equity release 
schemes should be regulated under the statutory scheme for the financial services regulator.  The Scottish Law 
Commission‟s Report on Vulnerable Adults (Scot Law Com 158, Edinburgh: The Stationary Office, 1997) 
defined „vulnerable adults‟ in terms resounding of incapacity, as „people aged 16 or over who are unable to 
safeguard their welfare or property and are (a) in need of care and attention due to age or infirmity, (b) suffering 
from illness or mental disorder or (c) substantially handicapped by a disability.‟; vi.     
25
 Section 1(4).   
26
 Section 2(1).   
27
 Section 16(2).   
28
 Emphasis added. 
29
 See discussion in Chapter Three, section 3(b). 
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nature and context of the transaction, but only those cases in which „The inability to make a 
decision [is] caused by an impairment of or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or 
brain‟.30 
 
The statutory definition of incapacity is relevant in cases where the Court of Protection has 
made a declaration, based on the „diagnostic test‟ of inability to make decisions.  Examples of 
the problems which may give rise to such an assessment include „psychiatric illness, learning 
disability, dementia, brain damage or even a toxic confusional state, as long as it has the 
necessary effect on the functioning of the mind or brain, causing the person to be unable to 
make the decision.‟31  In such cases, the court or another nominated person takes over 
decision-making relating to a range of issues, including health, welfare and financial affairs 
of the incapable person, and manages these decisions in the „best interests‟ of the 
incapacitated person.  This may include making orders or decisions relating to the use of 
housing equity to fund health and nursing care.  The person making the decision will have to 
weigh the needs of the older person (across the competing housing paradigms or home, 
investment and inheritance) and balance the risks of the alternative options to make a choice 
in the best interests of the owner.
32
  While these mechanisms are undoubtedly important in 
circumstances of medical incapacity, they are to some extent peripheral to the primary focus 
of this chapter, as the vulnerable person it not in fact making a decision themselves.   
 
Older (and other) owners may also be deemed to lack legal capacity under the common law, 
and this can potentially invalidate extant transactions.  In these cases, no order has been made 
under the Mental Health Act, so that the person is not under the control of the court but 
purports to make his or her own choices and decisions concerning financial transactions 
which use housing equity.  In Re MM (An Adult),
33
 Mumby J indicated that the definition of 
incapacity in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 merely replicated the common law definition,
34
 
                                                 
30
 Ministry of Justice, Mental Capacity Act 2005, Code of Practice (London: The Stationary Office, 2007), 
section 22.   
31
 Ibid.   
32
 It has been argued that the „best interests‟ test is not unproblematic, but that there are tensions between the 
abstract concept and its everyday application which could have a negative impact on the implementation of the 
mechanisms for devolved decision-making; see for example, MC Dunn, ICH Clare, AJ Holland & MJ Gunn, 
„Constructing and Reconstructing „Best Interests‟: An Interpretative Examination of Substitute Decision-making 
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005‟ (2007) 29 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 117.    
33
 [2007] EWHC 2003 (Fam), para 74. 
34
 See J Herring, Older People in Law and Society, (Oxford: OUP, 2009), p54. 
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which was explained by Butler-Sloss LJ (in the context of capacity to consent to medical 
treatment) in Re MB (Medical Treatment).
35
  It arises when:  
some impairment or disturbance of mental functioning renders the person unable to 
make a decision [because they are] unable to comprehend and retain the information 
which is material to the decision, especially as to the likely consequences of having or 
not having the treatment in question [and] the patient is unable to use the information 
and weigh it in the balance as part of the process of arriving at the decision.
36
  
A similar formulation was set out in Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co (No 1),
37
 in relation to 
the capacity to litigate, when Kennedy LJ held that: 
…the mental abilities required include the ability to recognise a problem, obtain and 
receive, understand and retain relevant information, including advice; the ability to 
weigh the information (including that derived from advice) in the balance in reaching 
a decision, and the ability to communicate that decision.
38
 
Mr Justice Mumby added that these various tests are simply different ways of expressing the 
same „general theory‟, which „applies, in principle, to all “problems” and to all 
“decisions”.‟39  The common law doctrine may be relevant where the older owner has already 
purported to enter a contract but then seeks to avoid the transaction on the grounds of 
incapacity: thus, while the legislation applies to „before the decision‟ orders, the common law 
is likely to be invoked in „after the decision‟ disputes.   
 
If a person was acting under incapacity at the time he entered into a contract this renders the 
contract voidable at the hand of the incapable party,
40
 provided that the incapacity was known 
to the other party at the time of the transaction.
41
  It has been argued, and in the New Zealand 
decision of Archer v Cutler the court accepted, that a contract with a person acting under 
incapacity might be unenforceable even if the other party was not aware of the incapacity, 
where the contract itself could be viewed as „unfair‟ or „unconscionable‟.42  This argument 
was rejected by the Privy Council in Hart v O’Connor (on appeal from the New Zealand 
                                                 
35
 [1997] 2 FLR 426. 
36
 Ibid, at 437. 
37
 [2002] EWCA Civ 1889, [2003] 1 WLR 1511. 
38
 Ibid, at para 26.  
39
 Re MM (An Adult), op cit, para 72; see also Sheffield City Council v E [2004] EWHC 2808 (Fam), [2005] Fam 
326, at paras [134]-[135]. 
40
 Re Walker [1905] 1 Ch 60. 
41
 Imperial Loan Co v Stone [1892] 1 QB 599. 
42
 Archer v Cutler [1980] 1 NZLR 386 at 398. 
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Court of Appeal).
43
  Mr O‟Connor, aged 83 and – unknown to the purchaser – of unsound 
mind, had agreed to sell some land to Mr Hart.  The Privy Council held that, since Mr Hart 
was not aware of Mr O‟Connor‟s incapacity at the time of the transaction, and there had been 
no unconscionable dealing, the agreement could not be set aside.  Lord Brightman stated that: 
...the validity of a contract entered into by a lunatic who is ostensibly sane is to be 
judged by the same standards as a contract by a person of sound mind, and is not 
voidable by the lunatic or his representatives by reason of „unfairness‟ unless such 
unfairness amounts to equitable fraud which would have enabled the complaining 
party to avoid the contract even if he had been sane.
44
  
The use of stark language („lunatic‟) in delineating the scope of the capacity doctrine 
emphasises its extreme nature, and underlines the unattractiveness of self-identifying within 
this group.  This principle seeks to strike a balance between the protection of the incapable 
person and the interests of the other party who had no knowledge of the incapacity, although 
it has been suggested that „in most cases the latter interest will prevail‟.45  As such, this 
condition applies a significant limitation to the circumstances in which contracts can be 
avoided for incapacity, and demonstrates the „defendant-sided‟ nature of this doctrine.46   
 
The use of incapacity to invalidate the contracts by which financial transactions for home 
equity use are carried out is both limited and potentially problematic, for several reasons.  For 
one thing, it is likely to come into play in only the more extreme cases of „medical‟ 
vulnerability.  In fact, as the following sections will indicate, many of the vulnerabilities 
which are likely to affect older people in home equity transactions are both less extreme and 
emanate from different sources, including factors which are „external‟ to the person – for 
example, vulnerability resulting from the social context of the transaction.  Heywood, 
Oldman & Means have criticised the tendency of social policy and practice to focus on „a 
medical model of disability focusing on the functional limitations‟,47 and contrast this with 
the social model of disability, which „does not see the „problem‟ as lying with the impairment 
                                                 
43
 [1985] AC 1000.  The burden of proving this knowledge rests on the person claiming incapacity; Molton v 
Camroux (1848) 2 Exch 487. 
44
 Ibid, at 1027. 
45
 TA Downes, A Textbook on Contract (London: Blackstone, 1993), p159. 
46
 See P Birks & M Chin, „On the Nature of Undue Influence‟ in Beatson & Friedmann (eds) Good Faith and 
Fault in Contract Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), for discussion of the differences between „claimant-
sided‟ (responding to vulnerability) and „defendant-sided‟ (responding to wrongdoing) protections; see further 
Chapter Ten. 
47
 F Heywood, C Oldman & R Means, Housing and Home in Later Life (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
2002), p28. 
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of the individual but within society itself.‟48  They argued that the role of society in creating 
the structured dependency of the elderly
49
 is particularly evident in the case of suitable 
housing for older people.  The emphasis on contextual factors in creating vulnerability might 
suggest that the social model of disability would offer more potential to align vulnerability as 
it is experienced by older people in the context of home equity transactions with capacity 
doctrine.  A more contextual approach also enables vulnerability to be protected without 
necessarily treating the vulnerable person as a „victim‟.50  However, even with such a 
recalibration within the legal doctrine, it remains the case that „disability‟ affects only a 
minority of older people.  Any approach which sought to utilise the idea of „disability‟ as a 
broader solution to the issues raised in this book would be both inappropriate and unattractive 
to the majority of older people.      
 
In Conceptualising Home, I set out the reasons – both in principle and in practice - why 
arguments rooted in dependency or presumptions of incapacity are unattractive as a route 
through which to address gendered vulnerabilities in the context of financial transactions 
affecting the home.
51
  In principle, arguments for legal protection which are based on 
incapacity are flawed where they rely on the assumption that age (or gender) can be equated 
with incapacity per se, and where they rely on a model of dependency which can be both 
inaccurate and have adverse practical implications.  Legal discourse has long recognised a 
risk that „special treatment‟ of a particular group of contractors might adversely affect the 
willingness of creditors to enter into contract with them,
52
 with the suggestion that any 
incursion into the protection of the creditor would inhibit transactions and make it more 
difficult for that group of consumers to access much needed capital.  This argument – though 
frequently made and implicitly accepted by the courts – has rarely been subjected to 
empirical scrutiny, despite the suggestion that there has been a „tend[ency] to over estimate 
heavily the effects of law‟.53  Nor is it universally accepted that the availability of credit is the 
                                                 
48
 Ibid.   
49
 That it is not that the individuals who are „disabled‟, but society that „disables‟ them. 
50
 Ibid, p29; see also M Oliver, The Politics of Disablement (London: Macmillan, 1990), and C Barnes, G 
Mercer & T Shakespeare, Exploring Disability: A Sociological Introduction (Oxford: Policy, 1999), contrasting 
the medical model and social model of disability.   
51
 See L Fox, Conceptualising Home: Theories, Laws and Policies (Oxford: Hart, 2006), Chapter Eight, 
especially pp365-6, 401-7.   
52
 Ibid, p366; also discussion at pp88-92 of the complex relationship between creditor protections and the 
availability of credit. 
53
 K Llewellyn, „What Price Contract?  An Essay in Perspective‟ (1930)40 Yale Law Journal 704 at 725. 
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most important measure of economic efficiency in credit markets;
54
 and even within the 
efficiency model, there is a need to balance the ready availability of credit against 
disincentives for effective gate-keeping by creditors who may be induced to take unjustified 
risks where they are assured of legal protection of their interests in any event.
55
   
 
This set of issues has important ramifications for the housing equity transactions executed by 
older owners.  The policy arguments in support of greater home equity use by older owners 
include the strategic benefits of (safe) home equity use for local and central government; but 
barriers to older owners‟ willingness to spend their housing wealth include concerns about 
the complexity, riskiness and value for money of such schemes,
56
 with the perception that 
they are „very risky‟ the strongest factor against equity release.57  The discussion in Chapter 
Four noted that the equity release industry has for many years been poised for market growth, 
but that building confidence in the sector – by addressing issues of mistrust – will be a crucial 
step in achieving that growth.  In this context, the arguments for striking the balance between 
creditor protections and consumer protections on the side of the creditor (rather than 
providing special protections for potentially vulnerable consumers) are undermined by the 
importance – both for the industry and for the achievement of government policy – of 
building confidence in equity release products by providing adequate protection for 
vulnerable owners.    
   
The arguments against „special protections‟ for certain groups have also been extensively 
rehearsed in the context of undue influence, where the proposition that one party (often a 
woman) is particularly vulnerable to undue pressure has been viewed as problematic since, 
while it responds to a reality that women have sometimes been adversely affected by 
structural socio-cultural inequalities in relation to rights in the owned home, the connotations 
of female dependency and incapacity – whereby the woman has to „fit herself within a 
                                                 
54
 AJ Padilla & A Requejo, The Costs and Benefits of the Strict Protection of Creditor Rights: Theory and 
Evidence (Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Research Network Working Paper #R-384, 
2000); M Manove & AJ Padilla, „Banking (Conservatively) with Optimists‟ (1999) 30 Rand Journal of 
Economics 324; M Manove, AJ Padilla & M Pagano, „Creditor Rights and Project Screening: A Model of Lazy 
Banks‟ (Boston, MA, Mimeographed document, 1999); see generally Chapter Four for discussion of challenges 
to the „efficiency‟ model of contract and property transactions.    
55
 RA Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), p440-1. 
56
 K Rowlingson, „Attitudes to housing assets and inheritance‟ CML Housing Finance Issue 10/2005, p1. 
57
 Ibid, Chart 3; see Chapter Four, section 5.  
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stereotype of the down-trodden and uninformed housewife‟58 - are unattractive.  Similarly, in 
the case of older people, it has been noted that „incapacity is often difficult to prove and 
represents a degrading method of protection.‟59  Relying on incapacity requires the older 
person seeking the protection of the law to demonstrate weakness or disempowerment; this 
form of protection echoes of paternalism, carries stigma, has negative connotations for 
personal dignity, denies the older person the opportunity to make choices, and appears to 
undermine their „autonomy‟.   
 
The discussion of aging in place in Chapter Five emphasised the importance of maintaining 
control over decision making and preserving the older person‟s sense of personal autonomy 
in order to support wellbeing in later life,
60
 including control over the home environment.  It 
noted that the loss of the ability to make choices and of personal autonomy may have 
particularly adverse effects for older people, and so counter the aims of policies supporting 
„aging in place‟.61  Any presumption that older people lack capacity would also potentially 
undermine their subjectivity within current legal/financial/risk frameworks by creating a stark 
choice between „autonomous individualism‟ and incapacity.  The blunt tool of setting an 
upper age limit on capacity to contract would present similarly stark alternatives, which 
would not only make it exceedingly difficult for older people to self-provide through housing 
equity transactions, but would overlook the heterogeneity of older people and discriminate 
against those who remain highly competent into advanced old age.
62
    
 
Capacity doctrine offers an „all or nothing‟ position between autonomy and no autonomy: 
characterising people as either able to choose (and so responsible for the outcomes of their 
choices) or unable to choose (and so „dependent‟); which relegates protection for vulnerable 
older people to claims based on incapacity, or disability, and does not address social or 
contextual vulnerabilities.  The usefulness of capacity doctrine in this context is also limited 
                                                 
58
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by the medical model of incapacity, which does not capture the cause of vulnerability in 
many cases; and that in the context of financial transactions (where an order has not been 
made under the Mental Capacity Act 2005), parties who do not have knowledge of the 
incapacity at the time of the transaction are not affected by the fact that someone was acting 
under incapacity.  There is clearly a wide field between capacity and incapacity, in which 
additional protections against vulnerability must be considered.  The following sections 
consider three alternative perspectives on the vulnerabilities of older owners when entering 
into transactions: the relationship between age and economic decision making; the issue of 
targeting and financial abuse of the elderly; and the question of contextual vulnerabilities in 
housing equity transactions.   
 
(3) Age, financial capability and economic decision-making  
 
While it is recognised that a minority of older people may be affected by impaired capacity, it 
is by no means the only source of vulnerability in the context of housing equity transactions.  
Another cause of vulnerability, which falls short of incapacity but which affects the ability to 
make economic decisions is related to financial capability.  The subject of financial capability 
has been examined in some detail in recent years by the Financial Services Authority,
63
 
whose statutory objectives include promoting public understanding of the financial system.  
In 2003 it published the National Strategy for Financial Capability.
64
  This initiative was a 
response to the increasing demands placed on individuals by the state to take responsibility 
for their own financial affairs, to plan ahead (particularly for retirement), and to choose 
financial products.
65
  It sought to improve financial capability through education and 
information, particularly for specific populations identified as „vulnerable‟.   
 
                                                 
63
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In 2006, the FSA carried out a „baseline survey‟ to assess levels of financial capability in the 
UK population.  It found that large numbers of people at all income levels lacked financial 
capability, and were unable to plan ahead or to make adequate provision for the future, for 
example by saving sufficiently for retirement.  It also found that while younger people (under 
40s) had less financial capability overall than older people,
66
 the over-60s were particularly 
strong at making ends meet.
67
  Although planning for the future was a particular weakness 
across the survey, older people were more capable of planning for the future than younger 
people.  It is these strengths in two specific aspects of financial capability that likely informed 
the FSA‟s decision not to focus on older people as a „vulnerable group‟, despite the fact that 
the over-70s were much weaker than the general population at choosing financial products
68
 - 
the specific capability which is most essential in housing equity transactions.  The baseline 
survey also found that 21% of people who have already retired find their income insufficient 
to give them the standard of living they hoped to have.
69
   
 
The general findings of financial capability survey indicated that many people take on 
financial risks without realising it because they have difficulty choosing products that meet 
their needs.
70
  The FSA described capability in choosing financial products are requiring „an 
understanding of risk: both what risks they face, and the trade-off between risk and 
reward…complemented by a good general awareness of the types of financial products that 
can help them achieve their goals…‟71  The survey found that people in the UK both under-
estimated and over-estimated the risks they faced, sometimes taking risks without realising 
they were doing so, or over-estimating risks, for example purchasing insurance that they did 
not really need.
72
  Many people took on inappropriate risks, as a result of poor choices, lack 
of awareness or failure to shop around for a good deal,
73
 with over 4 million people having 
bought their most complex product without considering any other options.
74
  The survey also 
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found that the vast majority of the general population (79%) relied on product information 
and/or non-independent advice when choosing the most complex product they had bought.
75
   
 
The research also explored the reasons why people chose particular products, and found that 
only 34% were influenced by the product features, with 21% making their decision because 
of price, 12% because the product was recommended by someone else, 20% because of the 
provider or ease of purchase, and 13% because it was the only option they had considered.
76
  
Only slightly more than half of people (54%) had read the terms and conditions of products 
they bought in detail, and in 9% of cases the terms and conditions had not been read at all.
77
  
On the specific issue of product choice, the survey found that the very young had the lowest 
levels of financial capability, and although the oldest respondents scored below average the 
FSA decided that any strategies to raise financial capability with respect to product purchase 
should be targeted at people under 40.
78
     
 
The baseline survey was followed by a series of follow-up reports, including an analysis of 
the impact of life events on financial capability, drawing on data from the British Household 
Panel Survey.
79
  This research focused particularly on the impact of life stages on financial 
capability: for example, having a baby, becoming unemployed, divorcing or separating and 
retirement.  The report found that retirement increased financial problems by 31%, due to 
reduced income, although it also found that those aged over 55 had higher than average 
financial capability, and that „the effect on financial capability of halving an individual‟s 
income, while large, is smaller than the effects of age, divorce or separation, being a local 
authority tenant and being unemployed.‟80  Where financial capability research has 
considered age as a variable, it has been the broad brush measure that „on average financial 
capability increased with age‟, and „that people aged below 45 have…below average 
financial capability, while those aged 55 and above have…above average financial 
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capability‟.81  To the extent that the level of generality adopted by the FSA project 
distinguished between more and less financially capable older people, it noted indications of 
a non-linear relationship, with less capability amongst the oldest age groups;
82
 and that on the 
measure of „choosing financial products‟, homeowners with mortgages scored considerably 
higher than local-authority and housing-association tenants, even after regression analysis to 
allow for differences in income and work status.  The researchers suggested that this could be 
attributable to an „area effect‟, with access to friends and family who are experienced in using 
financial products for advice enhanced the capabilities of older owners.
83
  Crucially, these 
findings did not identify „older owners‟ as a vulnerable population in relation to 
financial/decisional capability.       
 
The FSA‟s strategy in response to the low overall levels of financial capability across the 
population has included programmes to educate people and help them develop the skills that 
are needed to navigate through the demands of financial decision-making.
84
  This reflects the 
neoliberal agenda of improving „citizenship‟ by transforming „flawed‟ consumers into 
„skilled‟ consumers.85  While the FSA indicated that the financial capability research would 
also be used to „help inform our wider regulatory work to help retail consumers achieve a fair 
deal‟, its emphasis in this regard also reinforced the goal of greater self-reliance, „to develop 
more capable and confident consumers and to produce clear, simple and understandable 
information for consumers to use.‟86  To the extent that these aims are targeted at particularly 
vulnerable groups,
87
 the focus has been on schools, Higher Education institutions, 
organisations that help young and often excluded adults (for example, new parents and 
former offenders were identified as vulnerable groups) and the workplace.  The emphasis on 
                                                 
81
 Wellbeing, above, [6.2]. 
82
 Ibid.   
83
 Results, above, [6.9.3]. 
84
 See Financial Capability Targets 2009-10, online at http://www.cfebuk.org.uk/pdfs/fc_targets.pdf.  The 
Consumer Financial Education Body (CFEB) was established by the FSA to help consumers understand 
financial services and manage their finances better, see www.cfeb.org.uk, and given statutory footing in the 
Financial Services Act 2010.  The CFEB also hosts a website „Moneymadeclear‟, which seeks to provide 
impartial information and tools to help people make financial decisions; http://www.moneymadeclear.org.uk/.   
85
 See for example, Z Bauman, Work, Consumerism and the New Poor (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1998), p38, describing how those who make the wrong choice are stigmatised as „flawed‟ consumers; and N 
Rose, „Community, citizenship, and the third way‟ (2000) 43 American Behavioral Scientist 1395; J Flint, 
„Housing and Ethopolitics: constructing identities of active consumption and responsible community‟ (2003) 32 
Economy and Society 611; J Flint & R Rowlands, „Commodification, Normalisation and Intervention: cultural, 
social and symbolic capital in housing consumption and governance‟ (2003) 18 Journal of Housing and the 
Built Environment 213, discussing the neoliberal agenda of enabling vulnerable citizens to become more self-
responsible.  See further, Chapter Four, section 5. 
86
 Establishing a Baseline, above, p8.    
87
 Ibid, p22.   
17 
 
younger people is justified inasmuch as they scored lowest on many of the measures of 
financial capability, although people aged over 70 were usually the next weakest group, with 
adults in middle-age usually scoring the highest levels of capability, and the over 70s were 
identified as particularly weak at choosing financial products.
88
  Older people have not been 
identified as a vulnerable group for the purposes of the FSA‟s work on financial capability, 
although they can of course benefit from the support and advice offered by the FSA and the 
CFEB to the general population.      
 
The financial capability agenda can be described as a „pro-market‟ response,89 directed 
towards improving consumers‟ abilities to make rational, informed choices as „self-
responsible‟ citizens.  Yet, at the same time, the FSA itself has published a detailed review of 
behavioural economic literature which suggested that it is psychological rather than 
informational differences which account for the differences in financial capability, so that 
„people‟s financial behaviour may primarily depend on their intrinsic psychological attitudes 
rather than information and skills or how they choose to deploy them.‟90  This report 
suggested that in light of their emphasis on information and education, the financial 
capability initiatives the FSA is employing could be expected to have a „positive but modest 
impact.‟  This report argued that, to overcome the problems of financial incapacity,91 
institutional design and regulation, which take account of deep-seated psychological biases 
(procrastination, regret and loss aversion, mental accounting, status quo bias and information 
overload),
92
 are likely to be much more effective than education.
93
  Both the educational 
strategy
94
 and providing generic financial advice
95
 are very expensive, and the suggestion that 
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lack of information is not what really matters in financial capability underlines the limited 
value of this strategy.  It also raises significant policy questions concerning the „gap‟ that 
education and information cannot fill, and the extent to which alternative, protective 
measures are justified to bridge the chasm between expectations of financial capability in the 
neoliberal state and the realities of financial decision-making.  The role of institutional design 
and regulation on housing equity transactions for older people is considered in more detail in 
Chapter Nine.     
 
The specific impact of age on the psychological biases underpinning behavioural economics 
has been examined in a wide range of studies assessing the effect of aging on decision-
making.
96
  In one study that focussed on economic decisions, the researchers compared the 
results of experiments with healthy elderly individuals (highly educated relative to their age 
group, aged 70 to 95, average age 82), and younger students (also healthy and well educated, 
aged 18-26, average age 20), to ascertain their levels of confidence, ability to make decisions 
under uncertainty, differences between willingness to pay and willingness to accept, and 
strategic thinking.  This study – which focused on economic decision-making behaviour 
rather than financial knowledge or skills - found that, contrary to the „widely held 
notion…that decision making faculties decline with aging‟,97older adults‟ decision-making 
behaviour was similar to that of young adults.  While the older subjects were found to have 
less over-confidence, the study did not find significant differences in the behaviours of 
younger and older subjects, so belying the common stereotype that older people are 
„conservative, dislike taking risk and are set in their ways‟.98  In experiments testing 
endowment effect and loss aversion, the study found no significant differences between the 
young and the old, and on strategic thinking they behaved similarly,
99
 leading the researchers 
to argue that decision-making behaviour remains stable with age, and that „Aside from a 
minor propensity to make more confused responses on [one of the strategic thinking games], 
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there is no evidence of impairment in the reasoning and choices of the elderly population we 
studied on any of the areas of the survey.‟100   
 
This research suggests that healthy, well-educated older people do not experience a decline in 
economic decision-making resulting from aging per se.  However, this does not mean that 
older people‟s decision-making is the same as that of younger people, or that they may not be 
more vulnerable in financial decision-making as a result of other factors linked to the nature 
of the decision or the context in which it is made.  Some recent psychological studies have 
emphasised the importance of age-related changes in deliberation, affect and emotion on 
decision-making,
101
 reflecting what Posner described as the „knowledge shift‟ from „fluid‟ 
intelligence (the ability to analyse, solve problems, think deductively) to „crystallised‟ 
knowledge (reliance on one‟s own knowledge base, the accumulation of concrete experiences 
and interference of lessons from them, inductive abilities and „common sense‟).102  For 
example, Peters et al examination of the implications of “dual process theories”103 (the theory 
that decision-making has both deliberative and affective dimensions) on older people found 
that while „age-related declines in the efficiency of deliberative processes predict poorer-
quality decisions as we age…age-related adaptive processes, including motivated selectivity 
in the use of deliberative capacity, an increased focus on emotional goals, and greater 
experience, predict better or worse decisions for older adults depending on the situation.‟104   
 
Peters et al claimed that in identifying areas where older adults are vulnerable as well as 
those areas where they retain high levels of competence, it is important to recognise the 
interplay between the „rational‟ bases of decision-making and the affective and emotional 
processes which are „fundamental to older-adult decisions.‟105  They cited several factors, for 
example, decline in deliberative processes leading to an enhancement in more „implicit and 
automatic forms of knowledge (eg affect) in decisions‟,106 to argue that „reliance on affect 
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will increase as people age, or at least increase relatively over reliance on more deliberative 
abilities that require greater conscious effort or do not help meet social goals.‟107  „Affect‟ 
increases with experience over the lifespan as a particularly effective way of making 
decisions.  Affective decision-making is particularly prominent in certain contexts: when the 
decision is complex or must be made under conditions of pressure.
108
  The effect of declining 
cognitive/deliberative processes and increasing affective processes with aging mean that – 
depending on the context of the decision - older people‟s decisions may appear better than 
younger people‟s in some cases, and worse in others.109  For example, older people may be 
more vulnerable to salespeople who use affective techniques to induce them into scams or 
deceptive or misleading transactions.
110 
  
 
The ways in which individuals make decisions, and what they choose, is highly contingent on 
the properties of the decision problem and on the characteristics of the individual decision-
maker at the point that the decision is made.  While older people may be better equipped than 
younger people to make decisions in familiar life situations or where they have past 
experience,
111
 research suggests that they may make worse decisions „when complex or 
changing rules must be learned.‟112  It should not be assumed, however, that this necessarily 
decreases their overall decision making ability.  Some studies have found that we all 
adaptively select decision-making strategies, and that older people prefer simple, less 
cognitively demanding strategies, that use less information.
113
  As a result, they are likely to 
search for less information when making decisions compared to younger people.  The logic 
of this strategy is also supported by research that has shown that the probability of a person 
selecting the optimal option declines as the number of options increases, and that this is more 
pronounced for older subjects.
114
  These findings clearly undermine the application of the 
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standard economic assumption that good decision-making results from having a wide range 
of choices supported by information to older people‟s decision-making.115   
 
It is important to emphasise that these studies do not suggest that healthy older people lack 
capacity, or less able to make decisions than younger people.  Rather, they demonstrate that 
the cognitive processes and behavioural biases that guide decision-making are different for 
older people.  This means that assumptions adopted in legal reasoning, for example, that a 
„rational man‟ would act in a particular way, are doubly challenged in the case of older 
owners: the standard critical argument that law must recognise realities of human subjectivity 
as evidenced in behavioural economics is compounded by the claim that the „information 
paradigm‟ underpinning the liberal model of choice is particularly inept in respect of older 
adults.
116
  The claim that increasing information is likely to adversely affect the quality of 
decision making for older people, with more options linked to worse choices, raises the 
concern that the standard liberal model of autonomy has created laws of general application 
that affect older people differently.  In his book, The Paradox of Choice: Why More is 
Less,
117
 Schwartz, who claimed that as options multiply, overwhelming our ability to sort an 
devaluate, „choice‟ shifts from a liberating phenomenon to become debilitating or even 
tyrannical.
118
  At this point, he argued, „Having the opportunity to choose is no blessing if we 
feel we do not have the wherewithal to choose wisely‟.119  The behavioural research suggests 
that older people are likely to reach that point much quicker than younger people, so 
suggesting a further layer of constraint on the choices „freely‟ made by older owners as 
liberal subjects: in addition to the reality of constraints on the actual range of available 
choices (for example, the product options open to a particular older owner to release equity), 
the capability of processing those choices that are available to make the „right‟ decision 
presents a further challenge which, according to the behavioural findings discussed above, 
may be particularly problematic for older people.    
 
These issues are brought into sharp relief when people are required to make decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty.  With affect, or emotional processes, found to play a prominent 
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role in risky choice, a range of studies have focused on the specific effect of normal aging on 
decision making under uncertainty or ambiguity, and under conditions of risk.
120
  Kennedy 
and Mather have argued that older people are likely to be affected in decision-making for risk 
in various ways which adversely impact the effectiveness of their decisions, including 
„greater reliance on the affective heuristic, greater effort to maintain positive mood during the 
decision making process, greater attention to the emotional aspects of the decision making 
process, and positively biased memory for past decisions.‟121  Zamarian et al found that older 
people were better equipped to make good decisions under „risk‟ (when the uncertainties can 
be predicted by well-defined or estimable probabilities so that the risk can be understood) 
than under „ambiguity‟ (where the uncertainties are completely unknown and incalculable).122  
Older people were „more likely to make advantageous decisions when full information on the 
problem situation, the options‟ probabilities and the associated gains and losses is given‟; but 
had greater difficulty making good decisions when „the problem situation is poorly defined, 
information about risk is missing or conflicting, and they have to learn about the options' 
utility by contingencies.‟123   
 
These findings suggested that for older people to make good decisions, for example, in 
relation to financial transactions, it is better not to have a large quantity of information but to 
have a smaller amount of more specific, precise information concerning the particular 
situation, the risks, and the associated gains and losses.  A crucial question for this book is 
where responsibility lies for providing this type of qualitative information, which should 
ideally be contextually tailored to the needs, objectives and circumstances of the individual 
owner.  Empirical studies suggest that where the information strategy applied to older people 
is the same as that for younger people; and where the amount and type of information is more 
appropriately tailored to the younger person‟s needs (more choice, greater quantity of 
information), this is likely to disadvantage the older decision-maker.   
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The issue of „difference‟ in the effects of formally equal legal treatment has been extensively 
critiqued in feminist scholarship.
124
  A fundamental principle of non-discrimination is that 
while like cases should be treated alike, unlike cases should be treated differently.
125
  Yet, 
determining whether a particular difference is, or should be, legally significant presents 
dilemmas.  When difference is recognised in law or policy, the meanings it imbues have 
(sometimes unintended) consequences.
126
  We must be cautious about „labelling‟ a person or 
group as „different‟, particularly where such labels draw boundaries between 
normal/abnormal, or competent/incompetent people;
127
 within law‟s „bounded vocabulary‟, 
labels provide a blunt tool to differentiate people, and may generate legal disability.  
Concerns regarding the unintended consequences of singling out „vulnerable‟ groups for 
„special protection‟, and so reinforcing the stereotype that they are less capable, led „equal 
treatment‟ advocates within feminism to argue that equality requires equal treatment 
regardless of differential vulnerability,
128
 because emphasising the differences of a particular 
social group can „underscore their incapacities and special needs as the defining feature of 
their social identities and, ultimately, place them in subordinate positions within both public 
and private spheres of social life.‟129    
 
An alternative strategy in pursuit of equality is to argue for „special treatment‟ or a „positive 
action‟ approach,130 where differences between people mean that formal equality leaves them 
substantively unequal because they cannot live up to the accepted norm.  „Difference‟ sets 
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some people apart from the normative model of liberal legal subjectivity.
131
  While the 
unreality of the idealised liberal subject
132
 is such that many consumers are likely to have 
difficulty living up to its norms (as illustrated by the FSA‟s findings on financial capability), 
marshalling this lack of capability to argue for additional protections along group difference 
lines runs a risk of reinforcing negative stereotypes, for example, concerning the capacity and 
capability of older people.  Minow recognised this paradox in her observation that:  
Law has treated as marginal, inferior, and different any person who does not fit the 
normal model of the autonomous, competent individual.  Law has tended to deny the 
mutual dependence of all people while accepting and accentuating the dependency of 
people who are „different‟.133       
Minow described the philosophical, legal and strategic questions of how and when society 
and law should recognise difference as generating „dilemmas of difference‟: while 
recognising difference may reinforce negative connotations, and so threaten neutrality, 
equality and freedom,
134
 ignoring differences „may make them continue to matter in a world 
constructed with some groups, but not others, in mind.‟135   
 
Minow outlined three distinctive approaches to the issue of difference in law.  The first she 
described as the „abnormal person‟ approach, where categories are used to label people with 
different statuses (for example, capacity/incapacity).  In this category, the difference is often 
seen as „inherent‟ to the person, who is classified as „abnormal‟.  Minow argued that „The 
price of these legal categories has been borne disproportionately by the most marginal and 
vulnerable members of the society.‟136  The „labelling‟ approach is problematic inasmuch as 
it tends to treat the difference as the private, internal problem of the different person, and by 
extension, it „only hide[s] human responsibility for their treatment, [and does] not solve the 
problems of organising perceptions and responsibilities.‟137  Minow argued that if we are to 
achieve equality and justice for people who are identified as different from the norm, it is 
necessary to go beyond the „abnormal persons‟ approach and - by examining assumptions 
about the sources of difference and debating the dilemmas that difference presents - explore 
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alternative options for addressing them.
138
  Merely perpetuating assumptions about two 
classes of people fails to offer a way out of the dilemma of difference
139
 and, for older 
people, could potentially reinforce negative stereotypes about capacity and capability to make 
decisions, with implications beyond the immediate context to other areas of decision-making 
for older people.  In this way, what is intended as „benevolent prejudice‟ can result in harmful 
consequences or even hostile prejudice.
140
  Finally, the „abnormal persons‟ approach offers an 
„either/or choice‟ – as noted above, capacity or no capacity/autonomy or no autonomy – 
which may perpetuate inequality by including or excluding the person from the „norm‟, 
without challenging the assumptions of the norm. 
 
A second approach to difference employs a traditional rights paradigm to argue that equal 
rights for people with „real differences‟ justifies different treatment.  Minow argued that the 
rights approach, which challenges the exclusion of the „different‟ person from the community 
inhabited by „normal‟ people is also problematic in that while it permits different treatment 
for those who are „really different‟, it preserves the „either/or‟ construction of the problem.141  
Minow argued that 
When reformers seek to apply the language of rights, taking the rhetoric of equality 
and freedom literally, they encounter the dilemma that rights crafted for the norms 
reiterate the differences of those at the margin, and special rights crafted for those at 
the margin risk perpetuating the negative effects of difference.
142
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Another weakness of the rights approach, according to Minow, is its reliance on empirical 
„realities‟ that are themselves situated within normative structures as sources of knowledge 
about differences between people.
143
  In the case of older owners, a rights analysis could 
bolster the protections afforded to vulnerable parties in housing equity transactions, but the 
risk is that it would do so (or would be perceived as doing so) on the basis that they are 
„inherently‟ weaker than the dominant group, rather than challenging the unreality of the 
idealised norm.  As such, a rights-based remedy for discrimination risks creating new forms 
of discrimination and becoming a new source of stigma.        
 
Minow argues that the route out of the „double-bind‟ dilemma of difference is to focus not on 
the „different‟ individual, but on the unstated norms and assumptions that characterise some 
people as conforming to the norm while others do not.  „Difference‟ depends on a 
relationship, on „a comparison drawn between people with reference to a norm‟.144  Since all 
differences are relational – if one person appears „different‟, it is only because the other (in 
relation to whom they are different) meets the criteria of the dominant norm – Minow argued 
that responses to difference must adopt a „social relations‟ approach.  This approach sees 
difference as „a function of social relationships and invites a challenge to the patterns of 
relationships and knowledge that assign the burden of differences between people to only 
some people.‟145  From this perspective, „special treatment‟ simply recognises that the 
„different‟ person does not fit the assumptions of the norm against which she is judged, and 
„special rights‟ create false dichotomies which are slanted against the person who is different.  
Minow argued that it is the norms themselves which must be evaluated, not simply accepted 
as neutral, if we are to achieve equality and justice in cases of difference, so that difference 
does not mean disadvantage.   
 
The „social-relations‟ approach rejects the construction of problems of difference in either/or 
terms.  Rather, it is concerned with the relationships in which difference is manifest, the 
power that is expressed in the process of categorising people or problems, and the 
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institutional practices that determine a norm against which some people seem different.
146
  By 
doing so, it forces the statement of norms that have remained implicit.
147
  Once stated, Minow 
argued, these norms „become a subject for contest; alternative norms can be articulated and 
defended.‟148  By articulating these differences, „the social and institutional patterns that 
ignore this perspective themselves become questionable.  The status quo no longer seems 
natural and inevitable but is revealed instead as a reflection of choices made and choices that 
can be remade.‟149  
 
Iris Marion Young illustrated this approach in relation to older people in her work on the 
„politics of difference‟.150  Young described one of the differences of aging as a form of 
„bodily difference‟, and used the example of older people in the workplace to illustrate a case 
for „special rights‟.  She emphasised the relational basis of her approach to difference:  
the circumstance that calls for different treatment should not be understood as lodged 
in the differently treated workers, per se, but in their interaction with the structure and 
norms of the workplace…in the relationship of bodies to rules and practices...the 
political claim for special rights emerges not from a need to compensate for an 
inferiority, as some would interpret it, but a positive assertion of specificity in 
different forms of life.
151
   
This disjuncture between specific needs and the normative framework is crucial in 
determining the goals of legal strategies to address difference.  Young asserted that „The goal 
is not to give special compensation to the deviant until they achieve normalcy, but rather to 
de-normalize the way institutions formulate their rules by revealing the plural circumstances 
and needs that exist, or ought to exist, within them.‟152  This reflects Minow‟s argument that 
„difference‟ can only exist with reference to a relationship between two persons, and „that 
their relationship in turn depends on other relationships embedded in the social, economic, 
and political structure of society.‟153    
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In the context of financial transactions, this strategy could amount to a rejection of the „norm‟ 
of the consumer as an „autonomous individual‟, for a more realistic model of legal 
subjectivity that takes account real, contextual vulnerabilities.  Rather than branding older 
owners as „abnormal‟ and so lacking capacity to contract; or seeking to „train‟ the older 
person in capability so that they might better fit the model of „skilled consumer‟, a social 
relations approach to difference might challenge the norms of the neoliberal model of 
autonomous, self-responsible consumer on the basis that these norms generate inequalities.  
Indeed, Minow made a similar argument concerning the need for a „difference‟ approach to 
counter liberal individualism in the law of contract: 
The conception of individual rights exemplified by classical contract law neglected 
patterns of unequal power – called private but reinforced by public authority – which 
defeated any ideal of free and equal relationships…Scholars have started to urge 
acknowledgement of people‟s mutual reliance and dependence, and recognition of 
obligations growing from these relationships.
154
  
These challenges to the liberal norm were discussed in Chapter Four, and are considered 
further in section 7, below.  The advantages of the social relations approach as a strategy to 
respond to difference underline critiques of the dominant paradigms in private law and help 
to establish the case for a debate about the law governing financial transactions which 
challenges its unstated norms and assumptions, and seeks to generate more creative, more 
appropriate, and more equality and justice-oriented solutions.  While Minow acknowledged 
that the limits to the relational approach become clear when relational strategies do not seek 
to challenge the dominant ideology of individualism, or are unsuccessful in displacing the 
dominant norm, she argued that opening up debate around these normative questions is 
crucial if we are to „think seriously about difference.‟155 
 
In the contexts of financial capability and economic decision-making, the source of the older 
owner‟s „difference‟ is clearly located within the normative liberal model rather than being 
„inherent‟ to the older person.  Indeed, in the case of financial capability, the difficulties that 
older people face in living up to the idealised expectations of financial/risk subjects, are not 
so very different from those experienced by the general population, but reflect a „capability 
gap‟ that cuts across age.  Behavioural research has clearly established, and it is widely 
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recognised in critical legal discourses, that the norm on which the institutional expectation of 
financial capability rests is unrealistic for the population as a whole.  Research into economic 
decision-making and age only reinforces the extent to which the dominant normative 
perspective generates inequalities for older people.  Behavioural economics has challenged 
law‟s reliance on the „information paradigm‟ in relation to consumers in general; evidence 
indicating that the information paradigm is particularly unhelpful for older people can be 
viewed less as „difference‟ than as an exemplar of the unsuitability of this approach in law 
more generally.    
 
(4) Financial Abuse of Older People 
 
The particular vulnerabilities of older people to financial abuse has attracted considerable 
attention in recent years, from the scandals of UK telesales companies aggressively targeting 
older people for charitable donations they could not afford,
156
 to the US case in which a 
charity specifically targeted older people because they were „perceived as lonely, trusting and 
more polite, hence less likely to hang up before the telemarketer could make his pitch.‟157  
The vulnerabilities of older people to sales-pressure were recognised and given specific legal 
protection in the US through the Senior Citizens Against Marketing Scams Act 1993,
158
 
enacted in response to evidence that the elderly are targeted for fraud more than any other 
group.
159
  The source of this vulnerability is largely „situational‟ rather than „inherent‟: older 
people are more likely to live alone, with the result that they are more available to parties 
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seeking to take advantage and tend to be isolated in their decision-making.  Peters et al 
suggested that „geographically dispersed families mean that older individuals may have 
limited access to knowledgeable and supportive family members‟,160 while recent statistics 
from the UK‟s Financial Services Authority also suggest that older people are more likely to 
be targeted for, and are especially susceptible to, fraud, financial scams and other financial 
abuse, because they are the „most vulnerable‟.161   
 
There is no legal definition of „financial abuse‟ in the UK, although various charitable and 
governmental bodies have sought to develop definitions in recent years in an attempt to 
capture the exposure of older people to various forms of abuse and mistreatment.  The broad 
definitions that are typically used encompass acts which are crimes, civil wrongs, and in 
some cases not necessarily punishable in law.  In 1993 the UK charity Action on Elder Abuse 
drafted a definition of „abuse‟162 as:  
A single or repeated act or lack of appropriate action, occurring within any 
relationship where there is an expectation of trust, which causes harm or distress to an 
older person.
163
   
This definition „has at its heart the “expectation of trust” that an older person may rightly 
establish with another person, but which is subsequently violated.‟164  There is also a sub-
definition of „Financial Abuse‟: „stealing or defrauding someone of goods and/or property.‟  
Common examples include cases in which adult children attempt to justify their actions on 
the basis that they are simply obtaining their inheritance in advance, or where people misuse 
of powers of attorney.  Age UK
165
 add that financial abuse may also involve undue pressure 
to hand over money or sign over property.
166
  While some (but not all) cases of financial 
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abuse incur criminal sanctions, Action on Elder Abuse claim that these criminal acts are not 
always prosecuted, either „because very often the perpetrator can be someone‟s son or 
daughter‟, or because „age prejudice means that other people assume it is not happening or 
that the older person is to blame.‟167   
 
In „No Secrets‟,168 a UK Government publication providing guidance on the development and 
implementation of policies to protect vulnerable adults from abuse, a „vulnerable adult‟ was 
defined as someone:   
who is or may be in need of community care services by reason of mental or other 
disability, age or illness; who is or may be unable to take care of him or herself, or 
unable to protect him or herself from significant harm or exploitation.
169
  
This document describes financial abuse as a situation in which „a vulnerable person is 
persuaded to enter into a financial or sexual transaction to which he or she has not consented, 
or cannot consent‟,170 and later as „financial or material abuse, including theft, fraud, 
exploitation, pressure in connection with wills, property or inheritance or financial 
transactions, or the misuse or misappropriation of property, possessions or benefits.‟171  The 
breadth of the category was also reflected in a report for the UK charity Help the Aged, 
which identified financial abuse as including the more subtle acts of „exerting undue 
influence to give away assets or gifts‟, and „putting undue pressure on the older person in 
order to accept lower-cost/lower-quality services in order to preserve more financial 
resources to be passed on to beneficiaries on death.‟172   
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The risks associated with an older person‟s family or carers exerting undue influence or 
pressure were highlighted in Hammond v Osborn,
173
 in which a substantial gift from a 
vulnerable older man to his carer was set aside on a finding of undue influence.  Although the 
court did not consider that the carer‟s behaviour was sinister or amounted to „abuse‟ 
(wrongdoing), it emphasised that the protections which the doctrine of presumed undue 
influence seeks to provide extend to intervention, on public policy grounds, where the 
relationship between the parties „require it to be affirmatively established that the donor‟s 
trust and confidence in the donee has not been betrayed or abused.‟174  This focus on „a 
relationship of trust and confidence‟ for presumed undue influence emphasises a distinction 
between acts which may be viewed as exploitative when carried out by a person in whom the 
older owner has reposed trust and confidence, but potentially not so when carried out by a 
stranger.
175
  Yet, in other cases, definitions of financial abuse have looked beyond existing 
relationships to include „stranger abuse‟,176 which could include „being persuaded to buy 
equity release products that offer very poor value for money.‟177   
 
The UK Study of Abuse and Neglect of Older People („UK study‟) found that financial abuse 
was the second most common type of mistreatment of older people in the UK (after neglect), 
with 57,000 people over 66 reporting that they had experienced financial abuse in the 
previous year.
178
  The risks factors for financial abuse included people who lived alone, 
people who were in receipt of services, people in bad or very bad health, older men (both 
men aged over 65, and then with significantly greater prevalence for men aged over 85), 
women who were divorced or separated, and women who had experienced loneliness.
179
  
Older people with lower quality of life or who suffered from depression also reported higher 
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prevalence of financial abuse.
180
  While over 50% of financial abuse was perpetrated by a son 
or daughter, and nearly 70% by a family member,
181
 it was noted that this may be skewed by 
the high volume of help given by family members, rather than indicating that they are 
necessarily less trustworthy than non-family.  Another study indicated that older people are 
more likely to experience financial abuse than other groups of „vulnerable‟ adults.182 
 
The argument for „special protection‟ of older people in financial transactions was asserted in 
2007 when the UK charity Help the Aged published proposals to address concerns that older 
people are not getting the financial services or advice they need.
183
  These proposals included 
recommendations for a „new legal framework‟ to combat the abuse of vulnerable adults, 
enforceable against the financial services industry, and argued that the FSA „should actively 
engage in issues relating to financial abuse and publish its own plans for prevention.‟184  The 
review noted that „At present older people are often denied access to financial products, 
regardless of their individual risk profile, and products targeted towards older people can be 
more costly than for people in other age groups‟,185 although it did not specify how this 
would be achieved beyond indicating that where previous legal interventions have been 
„patchy‟ (across criminal and civil law), in future, „law‟ should be more proactive in relation 
to financial abuse.
186
  The strategy for achieving this goal – however, benignly - appeared to 
follow the „abnormal persons‟ approach to difference, asserting that legal protections for 
older people „should be based on capacity rather than age‟.187  This is perhaps explicable, to 
some degree, by the emphasis on „physical and/or cognitive impairments‟188 (with 
connotations of „disability‟) in its analysis of the sources of vulnerability. 
 
This is to some extent borne out in a 2005 study of susceptibility of older people to „undue 
influence‟, which identified a wide range of factors – both „inherent‟ and contextual - which 
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render people vulnerable to financial exploitation. These included advanced age (75+), being 
female, being unmarried, having suffered organic brain damage, cognitive impairment, 
physical, mental or emotional dysfunction (especially depression), recent loss of spouse or 
divorce, living alone, social isolation, being estranged from children, being financially 
independent with no designated financial carers, being in the middle or upper income 
brackets, taking multiple medications and frailty.
189
  Other studies have placed greater 
emphasis on the contextual nature of vulnerability to financial abuse.  Choi and Mayer found 
that financial exploitation was most common among older people and those who owned their 
own homes.
190
  Starnes identified several factors which render older people more vulnerable 
to consumer fraud including living alone (with no-one to consult about questionable 
transactions); relying only on the information given by the sales-person; having a greater 
desire for social contact than younger members of the population; limited access to transport 
and lack of nearby family adding to social isolation; and (particularly for elderly widows who 
had allowed their husbands to take responsibility for family finances) lacking experience in 
financial matters.
191
  The significance of contextual vulnerability has also been explicitly 
recognised in research on financial abuse of older people.  For example, it has been suggested 
that „The fact that more women than men are identified as suffering abuse is likely to reflect 
the fact that women live longer than men and are consequently more likely to be living alone.  
It is their circumstances that make women vulnerable to abuse, not their gender.‟192   
 
Meanwhile, in the UK, social policies focused on older people have explicitly moved away 
from traditional ideas of vulnerability on the grounds that the label of vulnerability „can be 
misunderstood, because it seems to locate the cause of abuse with the victim, rather than in 
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placing responsibility with the actions or omissions of others.‟193  This appeared to move 
away from the „abnormal person‟ approach; however, the language of the prevailing policy 
approach is on supporting „well-being‟194 and „safeguarding‟ older people195 to maintain their 
status as autonomous individuals: „to retain independence, wellbeing and choice‟.196  The 
emphases on independence and choice reinforce the model of older people as autonomous 
„responsibilised‟ consumers of care, and this is underlined by the proposed strategies, which 
typically have focused on information, advice and advocacy.
197
  While this is positive in the 
sense that (in light of the adverse impact of harms for older people
198) „prevention is better 
than cure‟,199 it tends towards an expectation of self-provision/self-protection model, which 
in turn is premised on the information paradigm.
200
   
 
Many of the trading practices that would be likely to be viewed as „financial abuse‟ are 
prohibited by regulations on commercial practices, for example, in the Consumer Protection 
from Unfair Trading Regulations,
201
 which imposes a general duty on traders not to trade 
unfairly and to seek to ensure that they act honestly and fairly towards customers.  While 
these regulations include potentially powerful enforcement mechanism - for example, fraud 
offences
202
 - they are primarily „provider-facing‟ in the sense that they do not provide direct 
redress for consumers, or affect the enforceability of the contract.  These Regulations also 
clearly demonstrate a commitment to the information paradigm: for example, „undue 
influence‟ is defined as „exploiting a position of power in relation to the consumer so as to 
apply pressure, even without using or threatening to use physical force, in a way which 
significantly limits the consumer‟s ability to make an informed decision.‟203  The gaps which 
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this leaves in the protections for potentially vulnerable consumers are discussed further in 
Chapters Eight and Nine.  Firstly, the following sections consider some alternative 
perspectives on the sources of vulnerabilities which, it will be argued, provide a stronger 
platform on which to rest critical analyses of the current legal frameworks.     
 
(5) Contextual or ‘situational’ vulnerabilities: Charting a path between incapacity and 
autonomy 
 
One of the persistent difficulties with the use of „vulnerability‟ as a basis for enhancing the 
legal protection afforded to older people is the way in which it has traditionally been 
presented as a „victim‟ status, involving loss of capacity and/or autonomy.  From this 
perspective, „real differences‟ between people are portrayed as generating an „all-or-nothing‟ 
choice: to be constructed as a „vulnerable person‟ and so attract protection you must present 
as unable to make choices; alternatively you are cast as an autonomous consumer who can 
make choices, but who must be self-reliant and self-responsible for the outcomes of those 
choices.  This choice is not neutral, but is heavily couched in socio-political subjectivities, 
and given effect within a framework of norms: it is a fundamental tenet of the liberal legal 
system that a person (an autonomous individual) has the right to make their own choices so 
long as they have „capacity‟.  This starting-point skews the normative structures that govern 
housing equity transactions towards autonomous individualism, notwithstanding the evidence 
that these are high-risk transactions, in which the complex decisions that many people 
(including, but not exclusively, older people) are required to make require a level of financial 
capability that – the evidence suggests - is not manifest in the general population.   
 
In cultural understandings of „risk‟, epitomised in the work of Mary Douglas,204 the idea of 
being vulnerable or „at risk‟ is increasingly associated with „victimhood‟, and an awareness 
of the exposure that results from being part of a world system.  Douglas argued that, 
particularly in the environmental context, the moral and political pressure that is brought to 
bear in relation to risk has largely been directed at large organisations rather than the 
individuals who experience the adverse effects when risk is realised.  This socio-cultural 
approach emphasises the responsibilities (or attribution of blame) that flow from the creation 
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of risk.
205
  In this frame, „Being “at risk”…entails being placed in the role of victim, 
threatened by risks imposed upon oneself by other agents, rather than being seen as bringing 
risk upon oneself through one‟s own actions…The political pressure that is brought to bear in 
relation to risk disputes is largely against exposing others to risk‟.206  While the discussion in 
this book has noted that the orientation of much of the political and policy framework for 
housing equity transactions has been strongly tilted towards individual self-responsibility, 
this is countered, to some extent, by the growing reach and rigour of regulatory responses to a 
range of specific housing equity products.
207
   
 
The tensions that exist between the individual responsibility of consumers and the 
responsibilities of the large organisations which profit from financial transactions have been 
brought into sharp relief by the global financial crisis which began in 2007, which has 
triggered a widespread review of regulatory practices and provided fertile ground for 
arguments that lenders must bear more of the responsibility for risk, particularly in the 
context of mortgage lending, for example, through more effective affordability checks, 
clearer product explanation and more stringent product regulation.
208
  In this „moment‟ of 
reflection, this book identifies a number of important questions to be resolved in respect of 
housing equity transactions.  There are a number of strategies which might be adopted to 
address these questions.  One set of strategies would work within the dominant framework to 
re-evaluate (1) how to strike an acceptable balance between protecting (potentially) 
vulnerable older people and respecting their „autonomy‟; and (2) how to balance the 
responsibilities of older people as „autonomous consumers‟ against the responsibilities of the 
financial providers who are actively seeking to encourage the growth of the equity release 
market.  A second set of strategies, which in the first instance might also lend support to these 
re-balancing efforts, would raise broader challenges to the normative framework, for 
example, by critiquing the false dichotomy of autonomy/dependency,
209
 or by challenging the 
institutional structures that create situational vulnerability for older people,
210
 from 
compulsory retirement to the attenuation of the welfare state, the expectations of self-
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provision and the emergence of the dominant paradigm of housing as investment asset to 
spend, all of which have contributed to creating the risk environment.
211
  
 
The association between age and vulnerability, with concomitant risks of ageism, is 
problematised by the tendency for law to focus almost exclusively on (lack of) capacity as the 
cause of later life vulnerability.  Yet, neither incapacity nor lack of autonomy is the primary 
source of older owner vulnerability in financial decision-making.  Rather, the research on 
financial capability, economic decision making and financial abuse suggests that contextual 
factors, from living alone to financial inexperience, from poor health to loneliness and social 
isolation are much more significant.  There is clearly not a perfect relationship between 
advancing age and vulnerability, with many older people highly capable, competent, and 
often well-off.  At the same time, there are also many marginal owner-occupiers, across the 
life-course, who experience social isolation, financial inexperience, poor health, loneliness 
and who have lower quality of life, all characteristics associated with vulnerability to 
financial abuse and a higher risk of entering into unfair contracts.  The distinctive factors for 
older people are the changes to income patterns after retirement which create new types of 
financial pressure, and the policy context which pushes them towards equity release to fund a 
range of needs increases the likelihood that they may be required to make complex financial 
decisions under conditions of financial pressure, leaving (marginal) older owners with lower 
value properties at particular vulnerability to disadvantageous equity release transactions.
212
 
 
In seeking to establish an acceptable mode of protection for vulnerable older people, 
„situational vulnerability‟ is strategically valuable inasmuch as it does not rely upon 
stereotyping older people in need of legal protection as weak or incapable, but recognises that 
the circumstances of aging in the UK in the early twenty-first century may expose people to 
specific risks in respect of financial provision.  Situational vulnerability not only leave the 
individuals at heightened risk of harms (the adverse impacts of which are discussed in section 
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6), but contributes to market failure.  When a sufficient sector of consumers are not focused 
on value for money, do not „shop around‟, or enter transactions while experiencing difficult 
financial or emotional situations that impair their ability to assess the transaction against 
alternatives,
213
 this undermines the competitiveness of the market, with adverse consequences 
across the sector.  The prelude to FSA regulation of „sale and rent back‟ transactions, 
discussed in Chapter Nine, exemplified this risk, and triggered the highest-level of FSA 
intervention in financial transactions to date.  It is also important to recognise that situational 
vulnerability itself is not randomly distributed but is related to income patterns, differential 
opportunities to accumulate housing wealth, levels of cultural capital and financial capability, 
and the success with which people have planned for retirement across their life course.  These 
contexts are crucial in shaping the „rational choices‟ that individuals make as autonomous 
consumers‟, so that:  
„In a world of individualised risk, responsibility and choice, some individuals are 
likely to be worse off in old age not because they make less rational decisions than 
others in similar situations, although this might sometimes be true, but because the 
context of their retirement planning is very different.‟214 
Those who are worse off are also most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of „bad‟ 
transactions.  The arguments for rooting any legal response to „difference‟ in the differential 
impact of adverse outcomes for older people are considered in section 6, below.    
 
Another strategy that might follow from an acknowledgment of the situational vulnerability 
of (marginal) older owners concerns the balance of responsibility between older consumers 
and the providers with whom they contract.  While contract law tends to be shaped by the 
„underlying assumption that individuals are by and large best placed to look after their own 
affairs‟,215 with legal intervention justified only in those „marginal cases where the 
assumption does not work‟,216 its assumption of individual self-responsibility‟ exists in 
tension with the outlook of consumer regulation, particularly when (as has recently been the 
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case) renewed arguments are advanced for „responsible lending‟, a concept that can be 
viewed as inherently „person related and need oriented.‟  Howells argued that:   
It seeks to place into the contract paradigm a concern to respect the needs of the poor 
consumer and the position she finds herself in.  It also requires of creditors an ethical 
standard…and requires them to acknowledge their responsibilities towards clients 
whom they dominate economically socially and psychologically.
217
   
These motivations can be found, to varying degrees, in the regulatory regimes that govern 
housing equity products and transactions.
218
  Williams summarised the situational risks 
inherent to equity release transactions when she claimed that:  
Today‟s equity release industry has been built around a strong recognition that it is a 
product area where there has been past abuse and where, without appropriate 
safeguards, there are serious risks to both borrowers and lenders.  These concerns 
flow out of a number of issues: 
 Potentially vulnerable customers 
 Potentially complex family dynamics around inheritance 
 Complex products not least in illustration and understanding terms and where 
house price dynamics can produce unexpected outcomes 
 Limited number of specialist brokers with full understanding of the market, risks 
and alternatives and relatively high commission payments 
 A regulatory regime that has taken some while to get fully into place 
 Taken together, a market place where risks for all parties are seen by some to be 
too high. 
Counterbalancing this, the simple reality is that households have a major asset, their 
home, which many need to access.
219
   
While this account clearly demonstrates the case for regulatory intervention, the context 
reflected also raises broader normative questions about vulnerability in financial transactions, 
with implications that go beyond the defined remit of a regulatory regime.  These questions 
are considered in section seven, below.   
 
(6) Vulnerability and adverse impact: The measure of harm 
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A further, distinctive aspect of situational vulnerability concerns the impact, or measure of 
harm, that a person would suffer if a transaction leads to adverse outcomes.  The particular 
vulnerability of older people to the adverse impact of bad financial outcomes was captured in 
a 2007 study on financial abuse for Help the Aged, which claimed that:  
Financial exploitation has a devastating effect on older people.  Not only can a 
comfortable lifestyle disappear, but also older people do not have the time or 
opportunity to recover financially.  In addition, such a profoundly disturbing 
experience can be a life-threatening event „characterised by fear, lack of trust and the 
onset, often, of acute and chronic anxiety.‟220       
It has often been recognised that older adults, who are no longer income-generating, are more 
vulnerable both to the practical effects of financial set-backs, and to the physical, emotional, 
psychological consequences of having made a bad decision which has led to financial loss.  
The UK government explicitly acknowledged this in its „National Strategy for Housing in an 
Aging Society‟, noting that, while homeownership has delivered substantial financial rewards 
for well-off older people, for marginal owners „there is also the prospect of the consolidation 
of poverty. For those who have missed out on life‟s chances, for whatever reason, those 
chances become fewer in old age, and the opportunities to replenish meagre resources 
diminish.‟221 
 
In addition to the limited opportunities that older people are likely to have to earn more 
money after retirement to make up for losses (or to use the terminology of insolvency, to 
make a „fresh-start‟), psychologists have noted that while „poor decisions early in life may be 
remedied by learning from mistakes and making better decisions in the future…as one ages, 
diminished physical capacity and less time can translate into reduced opportunities to recover 
from the „normal‟ ups and downs of everyday decision outcomes.‟222  This fundamentally 
undermines the liberal argument that agents of normal capacity will „win more than they 
lose‟, and so can „take the rough with the smooth‟.223  Rather, it indicates an additional source 
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of vulnerability linked to limited opportunities to recoup financial losses.  This is especially 
pertinent where it is housing equity, which may represent the older person‟s main form of 
saving, accumulated over a lifetime of work
224
 that has been lost.  The multiple functions of 
the family home – as housing, investment and inheritance – also mean that losses associated 
with this particular asset are likely to be particularly keenly felt.  Finally, the experience of 
financial victimisation also has specific impacts on older people, including psychological 
impacts (emotional distress, loss of self confidence, depression, thoughts of suicide and self-
harm),
225
 social isolation, deteriorating physical health, loss of independence, financial loss 
and adverse impacts on relationships with family and friends.
226
  Whether the incident is 
resolved also has a bearing on the abused person‟s resilience,227 as do their personal 
circumstances and characteristics, including their beliefs and norms, whether they were living 
alone, health and previous life experiences.
228
    
 
As the discussion of „dilemmas of difference‟ in section three has shown, a crucial question 
in analyses of differential vulnerabilities, and the strategies with which we seek to address 
them, is which differences matter, and in which contexts.  This section considers whether, 
both for individual equality and justice, and for the collective interest, the particular impact of 
adverse housing equity transactions on older owners is a difference that matters.  The idea 
that particular types of harms, or harms which particularly affect certain groups, justify 
specific legal intervention was explored in Robin West‟s work on „gendered harms‟.229  West 
identified a phenomenon of differentiated harms, experienced by women which have little or 
no counterpart in men‟s lives.230  She argued that:  
Women suffer harms in this culture that are different from those suffered by men.  
And partly because they are different, they often do not „trigger‟ legal relief in the 
way that harms felt by men alone or by men and women equally do.  As a result 
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women are doubly injured: first by the harm-causing event itself, and second by the 
peculiarity or non-existence of the law‟s response to those harms.231 
While West‟s analysis of harm, and her argument for a relational jurisprudential concept of 
harm, is based on women‟s experiences and relies heavily on women‟s bodily and biological 
differences, her general approach – which critiques the focus of economic instrumentalism on 
the preference satisfaction of rational men and the avoidance of transaction costs, and its 
failure to recognise social harm – can be usefully extended to capture the „invisibility‟ of the 
harms that older owners suffer in adverse housing equity transactions, and to posit the 
argument that greater legal intervention is required to avoid or rectify these harms.  West 
argued that, where difference renders women vulnerable to special types of harm, equality 
and justice demand that the legal culture recognise and respond to these differences.      
 
From one perspective, while aging obviously presents different issues and different examples 
of differential harms compared to gender, the disproportionately adverse impact of bad 
financial transactions on older people are derived, in part at least, from the impact of the 
„aging body‟ on opportunities to work and generate financial resources.232  Another approach 
might highlight the fact that, in light of their longer life-spans, aging issues are women‟s 
issues;
233
 similarly, in light of constraints on income and capacity to accumulate wealth and 
assets throughout the life course, which combine to make women more likely than men to be 
poor, issues relating to vulnerability in financial transactions in old age are also women‟s 
issues.
234
  Longer life-spans mean that women are more likely than men to have ongoing 
health and personal care needs,
235
 face the medical, social, cultural, economic and legal issues 
associated with aging, often without a partner, while their greater propensity to live alone 
places older women at higher risk of victimisation in financial transactions.
236
  The harm of 
adverse housing equity transactions impacts disproportionately on older people because they 
are likely to have significantly less opportunity (in terms of remaining lifetime and ability to 
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generate new financial assets after retirement) to recover from financial loss compared to 
their younger counterparts; and this harm is likely to be disproportionately (although not 
exclusively) experienced by women.   
 
Indeed, West used the example of „grossly unjust contractual bargains‟ to illustrate her 
discussion of the ways in which legal culture legitimates harms, so causing the harmed 
individual to lose consciousness of himself or herself as „harmed‟.237  Noting that in a market-
led political and economic framework „contract law enforces wise and unwise contracts 
against „losers‟ and winners equally‟,238 she argued that: 
The larger culture justifies this outcome with a sort of harsh, Emersonian, ethic of 
self-reliance: we have to learn to take our lumps, it‟s the price of freedom.  Legal 
culture, however, goes one step further: the harm is not simply justified, it is 
legitimated, which means in effect that the harm disappears.
239
 
The role of legal culture in legitimating, and so obscuring, the harms that result from adverse 
housing equity transactions also has particular resonance in light of the documented 
reluctance of older people to pursue legal remedies when they suffer losses in financial 
transactions.
240
  West demonstrates how this view is perpetuated by a legal culture shaped 
according to the rational precepts of law-and-economics, which have imported the political 
ideology of „market individualism‟ into contract and property law,241 and which demand that: 
„If the contract was “free” then all parties must, by definition, have gained.  There is, in 
effect, no loser in a market economy, where one invariably consents to only what one wants 
and one only wants what will benefit one.  No one‟s actually been harmed.‟242  Indeed, to the 
extent that the vulnerable party themselves subscribe to the dominant norms, West argues that 
they will „eventually view themselves as not only not entitled to legal relief, but as not 
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harmed.  Their acquiescence in the larger system is thereby secured.‟243  From this 
perspective, the risk of fostering ageism where older people are identified as „different‟ in the 
negative sense of being unable to live up to the „norms‟ attendant to being a „market actor‟, 
(and which the older person has internalised as required from a „market actor‟, so that failure 
to live up to the ideal is experienced as a failure in personal identity), are clear.  Yet, when 
the experience of specific harms „fades from view‟ - because they result from differences that 
are not „discriminatory‟ within a model of formal equality law, so that law and legal culture 
do not recognise the harm - West cautioned that „Those harms become, in effect, nor harms at 
all, but rather, the result of well-functioning private and cultural markets, free of pernicious 
and inefficient state intervention.  They become something to celebrate rather than worry 
over.‟244  
 
The particularly harmful impact of adverse financial transactions for older people has been 
recognised in the laws of some US states, which have provided particular protections for 
older people in the event of bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy laws provide a classic example of the 
liberal legal idea that people can take the rough with the smooth, weather financial failures 
and then start again with a clean sheet – a „fresh start‟ – the aim of which is to allow debtors 
to discharge their debt through bankruptcy and continue their lives free of debt.
245
  The 
inaptness of the philosophy of bankruptcy, which aims to give „the honest but unfortunate 
debtor…a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the 
pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt‟,246 is discussed in Chapter Seven.   The 
specific harms which result when older people experience adverse financial transactions are 
ignored by a model which relies on „future earnings as the key to rehabilitation‟:247 
bankruptcy is clearly a law of general application that affects older people differently to 
younger adults.  This difference is recognised when specific provision is made for older 
owners in bankruptcy proceedings, by allowing them to retain additional „exempt‟ property 
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(for example, „homesteads‟) with which to make their „fresh start‟, compared to younger 
bankrupts.
248
   
 
A claim to difference that is rooted in the differential impact of adverse financial transactions 
after retirement avoids ageist stereotypes based on individual physiological traits or 
„inherent‟ characteristics: it is a form of situational vulnerability, inasmuch as the difference 
does not reside in the person but in the circumstances they are placed in; it is based not on an 
„essentialised‟ image of the older person, but on the broader political, social and demographic 
contexts which shape participation in housing equity transactions.  Indeed, an emphasis on 
the impact of adverse transactions has the potential to be as universal as aging itself,
249
 while 
also exhibiting „across-category sameness‟ with other (younger) marginal owners who are 
likely to face particular difficulties in recovering from financial setbacks.  Similarly, while 
the „non-financial‟ impacts for older owners, resulting from the experience of adverse 
transactions, have been identified in targeted studies, the Financial Services Consumer 
Panel‟s definition of „consumer detriment‟ recognised that as a general group, consumers 
may experience non-financial detriment from adverse financial transactions, including „social 
exclusion, confusion, stress and anxiety and associated health consequences, irrespective of 
whether a financial loss has occurred.‟250  Focusing on impact or harm raises new critical 
possibilities for an understanding of vulnerability that challenges dominant norms of legal 
subjectivity, and through which aging can (in light of the specific social, political, 
demographic and policy drivers towards housing equity transactions) be viewed as a 
paradigmatic illustration of more universal sources of vulnerability affecting (particularly 
marginal) owners across the life-course; of the inappropriateness of the idealised model of the 
autonomous legal subject in context of complex financial transactions; and of the universal 
vulnerability of the human condition.
251
 
 
(7) Re-thinking responsibility for ‘vulnerable legal subjects’  
 
The socio-economic and political environments of aging in the early twenty-first century 
mean that, increasingly, many older owners will have no choice but to engage with some 
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form of risk in relation to the use (or not) of home equity after retirement.  While the risks 
associated with spending housing wealth, and the outcomes of housing equity transactions, 
can be both positive and negative – with positive aspects relating to lifestyle, better quality of 
life and avoiding poverty in old age – this book argues that the necessity for many older 
homeowners to participate in the credit market in one way or another, and to negotiate the 
risks associated with market participation, presents new questions for legal analysis.  The 
expectation that home owners will accumulate housing wealth during their lives to spend on 
welfare after retirement, and that they demonstrate individual responsibility as „active 
subjects‟ under neoliberal governmentality, provide important context for analysis of the 
ideas of responsibility and vulnerability as they are applied to older people in the current 
political and policy landscape.   
 
While the dominant themes in political and policy discourse concerning housing equity 
transactions reflect a particular construction of the older owner as a reflexive risk subject, 
„free‟ to negotiate choices as an autonomous consumer, the extent to which the general 
population – and, by extension, older owners - are likely to be able to effectively plan for 
(and finance) their futures is related to the social and cultural resources at their disposal, and 
their financial and legal capabilities when it comes to understanding complex products.
252
  
The gap between the idealised neoliberal consumer, and the reality of high-risk transactions 
which leave marginal older owners (and other marginal owners) vulnerable to adverse 
outcomes, highlights the potential for injustices and inequalities within the dominant 
(neo)liberal normative domain of housing equity transactions.  The relationship between 
socio-economic inequality (marginality) across the life-course and heightened exposure to 
risk in housing equity transactions has also been clearly established.  Furthermore, as West‟s 
concept of harm reveals, the dominance of a particular normative framework can inhibit 
law‟s ability to recognise and remedy these adverse outcomes; indeed, where „victims‟ 
themselves internalise the norms, they may not recognise, or pursue legal recompense for, 
harms they have suffered.      
 
Representing this type of inequality within the dominant liberal norms that have shaped 
English „private‟ law is not straightforward.  Liberal legal theory emphasises the values of 
autonomy and choice, with the positive „entrepreneurial‟ aspects of risk-taking in relation to 
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house purchase tending to characterise legal perspectives on these transactions, which are 
anchored in the typically non-market interventionist approaches of property law and contract 
as „private‟ law domains.  Yet, this model of consumers in domestic property transactions as 
„responsible risk-takers‟ has been challenged by the recent global financial crisis, which has 
demonstrated how risks in the financial system can potentially impact on all consumers, 
calling into question the „overly optimistic view of self-regulating markets‟.253  Indeed, even 
before the „credit crunch‟, the relationship between risk, responsibility and regulation had 
emerged as an important theme in UK policy,
254
 with the growing reach of the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) demonstrating the use of (albeit „light-touch‟) regulatory 
approaches as a response to the risks associated with financial transactions.  Since the 
financial crisis, the UK government has made an explicit commitment to a more responsible 
regulatory regime.
255
  This section argues that this process, and other responses to 
vulnerability in housing equity transactions, is usefully informed by re-conceiving the norm 
of (older) owners as (self-responsible) consumers towards a more realistic concept of older 
(and potentially other marginal) owners as „vulnerable legal subjects‟.   
  
The (co-)existence of competing characterisations of the consumer as a legal subject, with 
implications for the nature and extent of legal interventions in „private‟, market transactions, 
has been recognised in a range of legal contexts.  For example, Dyal-Chand contrasted US 
mortgage law‟s paradigm of the „ignorant borrower‟ with credit card law‟s „enlightened 
borrower‟.256  While mortgage law recognised „situational vulnerability‟,257 leading to 
specific and meaningful substantive legal protections, the „enlightened borrower‟ (read 
„autonomous consumer‟) of credit card law attracted only the procedural protections of the 
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„information paradigm‟,258 despite being drawn from the same constituency of borrowers.  In 
a similar vein, Hunter and Nixon‟s analysis of judicial attitudes towards owners 
(„autonomous consumers‟) and tenants („vulnerable subjects‟) facing actions for financial 
default in English courts revealed the significance of these characterisations for judicial 
interpretations of statutory provisions,
259
 resulting in a higher risk of eviction for the owner 
relative to tenants.
260
   
 
Yet, while the paradigm of autonomous consumer clearly leaves the owner exposed to 
heightened risks, the basis of any claim to legal protection poses a dilemma: how can a claim 
to legal protection, recognising the realities of situational vulnerability, avoid falling into the 
trap of perpetuating ageist stereotypes?  This section proposes that the resolution to this 
dilemma can be found in feminist critiques of the core content of the „autonomous consumer‟ 
model (with its roots in the contested concepts of „rational choice‟, „consent‟ and 
„autonomy‟); in the realisation that the „differential‟ vulnerability experienced by marginal 
older owners in fact reflects a „sameness‟ with other marginal or „vulnerable‟ populations; 
and in the universal and inevitable nature of aging.  While the dominant normative 
framework presents autonomy/capacity (within the liberal legal meaning of the term)
261
 and 
dependency/vulnerability as opposite poles, challenges to the assumptions that underpin the 
conventional „autonomous consumer‟ model provide a way out of this dilemma. 
 
Feminist scholarship has long recognised the conflict between autonomy and 
welfare/protection in the context of contracts and the market,
262
 and the problematic nature of 
the economic conception of „rational choice‟.  Hadfield captured the „dilemma‟ of choice in 
her claim that while feminists seek to overcome the historical subjugation that has deprived 
women of autonomy and choice, they remain anxious „that autonomy and choice through 
contract and the market are traps that will only further ensnare women in disadvantage and 
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degradation‟.263  The legal, economic, and political subject of „rational economic man‟,264 the 
norms of liberal market individualism,
265
 and the conception of the „autonomous individual‟ 
that has been adopted by liberal institutions,
266
 have all been widely criticised in feminist 
analyses on the basis that they are based on unrealistic portrayals of human subjectivity that 
reinforce privilege and perpetuate inequality.  „Rational choice‟, while widely regarded as the 
legitimate basis for liberal approaches in classical and neoclassical contract law,
267
 is heavily 
contested as an epistemological concept
268
 and as an explanation for human motivation.
269
  
Claims that individuals are rational (that they take purposive action, have consistent 
preferences and are utility maximising), self-interested and individualist are challenged by 
behavioural evidence of „imperfect rationality‟.270  Feminist and critical contract scholarship 
has often demonstrated that choices are not necessarily shaped by the drive to maximise 
wellbeing or autonomy.
271
  The argument that „choice‟ can be regarded as synonymous with 
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„autonomy‟ is challenged by evidence that even „free‟ choices can sometimes be harmful to 
welfare, and so reduce the legal subject‟s autonomy.272   
 
One of the risks for older owners entering housing equity transactions is that the exercise of 
autonomy might reduce their (future) welfare, for example, where the product is 
inappropriate or poor value for money, or where the option taken is not suitable to the needs, 
objectives and circumstances of the older person.  As such, the relationship between 
autonomy and welfare in this context is not fixed but fluid.  This perspective has significant 
implications for arguments concerning legal intervention, since it posits that „endorsing 
autonomy does not imply choosing the market over regulation or ignoring actual welfare in 
favour of deference to private ordering…‟273  Once autonomy is de-coupled from choice and 
welfare, the relevant question is not how law can promote autonomy (in the belief that 
welfare will automatically follow), but how „various institutions might be coordinated so as 
to promote both autonomy and welfare‟,274 taking account of the risks to the various parties to 
the contract and the relative impact of harms (including non-financial harms) on each 
party.
275
  Through this process, law can be seen to have a role in „structur[ing] the relations 
that establish the preconditions for truly autonomous choice‟;276 that is, for choices that 
genuinely enhance well-being and promote autonomy. 
 
The development of a legal strategy that pursues both well-being and (the broader meaning 
of) autonomy is usefully supported by feminist critiques of the conventional conception of 
rational choice, which emphasise the tensions between the narrow, abstract, economic and 
legal concept of autonomy and the situational realities of inequality.
277
  To the extent that the 
enforcement of contracts is justified by principles of voluntariness and informed choice, 
arguments for non-enforcement must „demonstrate a defect in the circumstances of choice: a 
failure of voluntariness or an absence of adequate information‟.278  If enforceability turns on 
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establishing voluntary and informed choice, the inquiry undertaken by a court when 
petitioned to intervene is shaped around fact of choice, not the wisdom or consequences of 
the choice that was in fact made, or the question of whether the choice in fact enhanced or 
reduced the claimant‟s autonomy or welfare.279  Hadfield argued that a better juristic 
understanding of „rational autonomous choice‟ would require reasons beyond the fact of 
contemporaneous choice when the contract was made to justify the enforcement of 
obligations,
280
 to recognise the complexities of what it means to chose and the evolving 
nature of the parties‟ rational choice(s).   
 
The conventional commitment to contractual enforcement based on consent, resting on the 
belief that respecting the rational choices of „autonomous consumers‟ is morally justified 
because it fosters autonomy and increases individual and societal wellbeing has also been 
criticised on the basis that it „rests on a severely inadequate picture of human nature and 
human motivation.‟281  In her critique of the moral value which Posner attached to consent, 
West argued that the rational, autonomous consumer paradigm „defines the problem of 
victimisation out of existence‟282 by allowing the experiences of „wealth-maximising 
winners‟ to shape the normative context in which we judge the enforceability of transactions: 
Posner teaches us that when the risk of a loss is voluntarily assumed, the ultimate 
suffering of that loss is consensual and we consequently need concern ourselves no 
more with losers in the market than with those in a lottery.
283
 
West argued that legal theories based on rational choice minimise, trivialise and ignore the 
differences between „winners‟ and „losers‟, describing the theoretical step of „dismiss[ing] 
losers on the basis of a facile judgment that they consented to play the game‟284 as „morally 
indefensible‟.  Rather than viewing the „failure‟ of these losers as a matter of individual 
responsibility, West argued that, in circumstances where the assumption of risk is not 
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rational, justified, morally appealing and so worthy of respect, the community has a moral 
responsibility to intervene. 
 
This community responsibility is underlined, in the case of housing equity transactions, by 
the extent to which the decision to spend housing equity is embedded in social contexts and 
political and policy agendas.
285
  While the idea of rational, self-interested, utility maximising, 
autonomous individuals is compelling,
286
 the reality of decision-making is that it does not 
involve isolated choices, but is embedded in social contexts; decision-making subjects are not 
„isolated and ever-consciously rational‟, but social and pragmatic.287  This portrait of the legal 
subject as part of an ongoing relational dynamic, who operates within a social network rather 
than as an atomised individual,
288
 echoes a fundamental tenet of relational feminism
289
 and 
enables us to recognise the reality of social context without diminishing the actor‟s agency. 
 
The proposition that „thinking‟ and decision-making are not isolated but contextual and 
situated underpins arguments for contextual approaches to law and legal theory.
290
  Minow 
and Spelman argued that, in addition to its case-by-case relevance, contextual analyses also 
signal patterns of difference from the dominant norm, and thus „expose how apparently 
neutral and universal rules in effect burden or exclude anyone who does not share the 
characteristics of privileged, white, Christian, able-bodied, heterosexual, adult men for whom 
those rules were actually written.‟291  They argued that since all rules must be shaped against 
some context,
292
 the „default‟ choice of context „implies a preference for one set of analytic 
categories rather than another‟;293 for example, for „autonomous individualism‟ over group-
based claims for legal protection or social justice.   
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Considering legal subjects in context is also crucial when reasoning about the morality of 
legal intervention (or non-intervention) in respect of risks or harms.  Gilligan argued that 
„Only when substance is given to the skeletal lives of hypothetical people is it possible to 
consider the social injustice that their moral problems may reflect and to imagine the 
individual suffering their occurrence may signify or their resolution engender.‟294  In the 
context of housing equity transactions, a contextual approach would seek to capture the 
specific vulnerabilities of the older owner (including situational vulnerabilities such as the 
impact of adverse transactions) within the legal frameworks that regulate the creation, content 
and enforcement of obligations, so that law can seek to „capture the complexities of [the] 
moral and political situations and thereby address [the] moral and political dilemmas more 
responsively and responsibly.‟295  A crucial question, of course, is which contexts should 
matter.  Minow and Spelman argued that:   
in many contemporary political and legal discussions, the demand to look at the 
context often means a demand to look at the structures of power, gender, race, or class 
relationships, or the effects of age and physical vulnerability on people‟s abilities to 
protect themselves…against the backdrop – the context by default – created by 
Western liberal legal and political traditions that emphasise as ideals individual 
freedom, equality, universal reason, and abstract principles.
296
   
One aim of this analytical move is to challenge false claims of universality, and so expose the 
role of power in controlling definitions of difference to work in the favour of the dominant 
group, thereby providing a basis for critical scrutiny of difference based on gender, race, class 
or age.
297
   
 
In attempting to re-think the question of who bears responsibility for losses resulting from 
adverse transactions, and when the „mistakes‟ that individuals make merit legal 
intervention,
298
 one approach is to focus on those cases which are likely to result in a 
substantial welfare loss.  For example, where the neoclassical approach to law and economics 
relies on the assumptions that consumers who „lose‟ in an individual transaction will learn 
from their mistakes and from those made by others, a contextual analysis recognises that this 
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is not universally true.  An older owner who experiences an adverse housing equity 
transaction is likely to have little time and no opportunity to recover the losses and re-engage 
in the market to repeat the exercise, thus limiting their „intrapersonal learning‟,299 while 
„interpersonal learning‟ amongst marginal and older consumers is inhibited by a range of 
factors including social isolation, being less likely to complain and lack of access to a wider 
community with financial capability/experience in the area of specialised housing equity 
products.
300
  Bar-Gill argued that consumer learning is further inhibited by the different uses 
that individuals may put to the same product,
301
 also underlining the need for contextual 
understandings of the needs, objectives and circumstances of the individual consumer in the 
particular transaction.
302
   
 
Contextual analyses do not rely on demonstrating that the individual who has suffered a loss 
lacked capacity to consent, was „weak‟ or incapable, but locate the grounds for enforcing the 
contract, or not, in a real measure of the transaction, including situational vulnerabilities 
(marginality or inequality) affecting consent, and the welfare consequences of enforcement 
(the impact) for that person.  The inadequacy of „consent‟ as a basis for individual 
responsibility, and the moral argument for a shift away from individual (self-) responsibility, 
towards a more community oriented framework when dealing with serious social needs, have 
also been central themes of Fineman‟s work on autonomy,303 dependency,304 and most 
recently vulnerability.  Fineman is critical of the rhetorical use of privatisation („self-
responsibility‟) as a solution to complicated social problems which reflect persistent 
inequality and poverty.
305
  As the discussion in previous chapters has show, the political and 
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policy moves that have transferred responsibility for financial provision in old age onto 
private individuals, through self-provision and specifically through housing equity release, 
provide a paradigmatic example of the ways in which the state has asserted „that the private 
market can better address historically public issues than can the public government‟.306  
Fineman criticised the weight attached to „consent‟ as the justification for self-responsibility 
within this „private‟ market, and as „the basis for withholding public (or other) aid from 
someone in a needy position‟:307 
The argument may be phrased as getting what one „asked for‟ or as the justice of 
having  to „lie in the bed‟ that one has „made‟.  The idea is the individual 
circumstances are the result of individual choices, freely made, and, therefore, that 
consequences, even if negative, are justified.
308
  
Within this rhetoric, the state and the market avoid responsibility for inequalities by holding 
the individual to be „self-responsible‟ not only for their specific contractual choices, but for 
the „life circumstances‟ they find themselves in, thus ignoring the significant role of 
contextual or situational vulnerabilities, as well as the policies that constraining individual 
choices by „funnel[ling] decisions into prescribed channels and…operat[ing] in a practical 
and symbolic manner to limit, or practically eliminate, options‟.309   
 
Fineman argued that the idealised paradigm of the autonomous self-responsible consumer is 
given effect as a dominant norm by the „public‟ support of private contracting through the 
legal system.
310
  Yet, to the extent that housing equity transactions have come to serve an 
essential public function in society – enabling self-provision for financial well-being after 
retirement in an economic and policy landscape where this is increasingly necessary – the 
ways in which they are supported by legal institutions is a crucial pillar in the administration 
of justice, particularly for those older owners who are already vulnerable due to existing 
inequalities.  If the institutions of the state (including law) are to play a role in supporting the 
policy drive towards equity release after retirement, they must be responsive to the 
consequences of these transactions,
311
 including thinking seriously about the responsibilities 
of the market and the state for the risks inherent to such transactions. 
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Fineman‟s most recent work on „vulnerable legal subjects‟312 provides a valuable critical 
framework for conceptualising this shift from older owner as autonomous consumer to 
consumers as vulnerable legal subjects.  Traditional legal analyses (utilising the reasoning 
paths offered by property law and contract) have long been trapped in the autonomy/capacity 
dilemma, where the only alternative to being an autonomous consumer taking responsibility 
for one‟s own choices, was incapacity.313  Fineman‟s „vulnerable legal subject‟ offers the 
possibility of shifting from the restrictive domain of autonomy/capacity, to a new paradigm 
of vulnerability/responsibility.  It challenges the rhetoric of non-intervention, the 
„idealisation‟ of contract and the „reification of individual choice‟; and accepts the potential 
for the broader socio-economic and political contexts in which parties (eg older owners) 
make decisions (to enter housing equity transactions) to perpetuate inequality.  Fineman‟s 
strategy is rooted in the human experiences of „real-life subjects‟,314 and seeks to move 
beyond the „sameness of treatment‟ response to inequality to emphasise the particular 
vulnerabilities of older owners as a category of consumer, and so to devise appropriate 
responses to „past circumstances and future obligations‟ – that is, to the circumstances, needs 
and objectives which drive these transactions and which can render older owners vulnerable 
in this context, as well as to the impact of the transaction on their future wellbeing.   
 
Finally, by negotiating the „theoretical and empirical pitfalls‟ that arise from the 
heterogeneity of identity groups – including the relative privilege enjoyed by some members 
of the group – Fineman‟s theory seeks to offer a „universal‟ strategy to address 
vulnerabilities.  Applying the idea of universality to the context of housing equity, it is 
possible to recognise that while sources of vulnerability are to some extent specific to older 
owners they are not experienced by all older owners, but tend to be concentrated amongst 
marginal owners; and that younger, marginal, owners are also exposed to similar 
vulnerabilities due to their inequalities.  Since the vulnerability approach emphasises the 
possibility of harm, its approach is universal in the sense that „Constant and variable 
throughout life, individual vulnerability encompasses not only damage that has been done in 
the past and speculative harms of the distant future, but also the possibility of immediate 
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harm.‟315  This susceptibility to harm is conceptualised as fundamental to the human 
condition.  Fineman argued that  
We are beings who live with the ever-present possibility that our needs and 
circumstances will change.  On an individual level, the concept of vulnerability 
(unlike that of liberal autonomy) captures this present potential for each of us to 
become dependent based upon our persistent susceptibility to misfortune and 
catastrophe.
316
   
Re-conceiving older owners as vulnerable subjects offers an alternative way out of the 
dichotomy of autonomy and dependence.  Fineman claimed that her new understanding of 
vulnerability, which is not bound to ideas of „victimhood, deprivation, dependency, or 
pathology‟317 but describes „a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition 
that must be at the heart of our concept of social and state responsibility‟,318 is „freed from its 
limited and negative associations [to become] a powerful conceptual tool.‟319  This 
„vulnerable legal subject‟ also resonates with the concept of risk, with its universal character 
„understood as a state of constant possibility of harm.‟320  In this respect, vulnerability is both 
universal and particular, „experienced uniquely by each of us and this experience is greatly 
influenced by the quality and quantity of resources we possess or can command‟, and clearly 
present in the differential exposure to risk for older owners, especially where transactional 
vulnerabilities are „situational‟ or „impact-based‟.  
 
This chapter‟s analyses of older owners in financial transactions has revealed the distinctive 
vulnerabilities that housing equity transactions, and the risks they carry, engender for older 
owners; and also the importance of grounding any claim to „difference‟ in situational 
vulnerabilities such as the differential impact of adverse financial transactions on (marginal) 
older people (as opposed to specific claims that older people lack autonomy or are incapable 
of contracting).  This reflects the „life-course‟ approach of the vulnerability thesis: while the 
lived realities of human subjects involve a range of „possible stages‟ within the „normal‟ 
lifespan, the adult liberal subject reflects only one such stage,
321
 whereas „human reality 
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encompasses a wide range of differing and interdependent abilities over the span of a 
lifetime‟.322  Fineman‟s approach places particular emphasis on the responsibilities of the 
state
323
 to „ensure that institutions and structures within its control do not inappropriately 
benefit or disadvantage certain members of society.‟324  The remaining chapters of this book 
take forward the call for more responsive and responsible responses to vulnerability by 
applying the discursive tropes of vulnerability and responsibility to consider the extent to 
which English law has responded to the vulnerabilities of older owners in housing equity 
transactions.  The remaining chapters consider how the axes of legal analyses could be re-
calibrated to reflect the realities of older owners‟ vulnerabilities, and the responsibilities of 
credit providers (as agents of financial market institutions) and legal institutions (as organs of 
the state) in respect of the risks of adverse transactions.  Where the liberal approach 
emphasises the individual responsibility of the consumer, this analysis argues that the state, 
through legal institutions, bears responsibilities in respect of vulnerable older owners to 
ensure that they are treated equitably.
325
   
 
(8) Conclusions 
 
The socio-economic and political environments of aging in the early twenty-first century 
mean that, increasingly, many older owners have no choice but to engage with some form of 
risk in relation to the use (or not) of home equity after retirement.  The expectation that home 
owners will accumulate housing wealth during their lives to spend on welfare after 
retirement, and demonstrate individual responsibility as „active subjects‟ under neoliberal 
governmentality,
 
provide an important context for analysis of the ideas of responsibility and 
vulnerability as they are applied to older people in the current political and policy landscape.  
The dominant themes in liberal discourses reflect a particular construction of the older owner 
as a reflexive risk subject, „free‟ to negotiate choices as an autonomous consumer.  Yet, the 
extent to which the general population – and, by extension, older owners - are likely to be 
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able to effectively plan for (and finance) their futures is clearly linked to the social and 
cultural resources at their disposal, as well as to their financial and legal capabilities to 
understand complex products.   
 
The „autonomous consumer‟ paradigm has been challenged by the recent global financial 
crisis, which has demonstrated the injustices that can result from assumptions of self-
responsibility in relation to risky financial transactions, and has called into question the 
„overly optimistic view of self-regulating markets‟.326  Even before the „credit crunch‟ which 
started in 2007, the relationship between risk, responsibility and regulation had emerged as an 
important theme in UK policy,
327
 with the growing reach of the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) providing an example of use of (albeit „light-touch‟) regulatory approaches as a 
response to the risks associated with financial transactions.  Since the financial crisis, the UK 
government has made an explicit commitment to a more responsible regulatory regime,
328
 
opening up the field of analysis for the prospect of re-conceptualising „owners as consumers‟, 
including in particular, „older owners as consumers‟, as „vulnerable legal subjects‟.   
 
One of the prominent features of the latest housing market and general economic recessions 
is the impact of harms that begin with individual default and consumer losses for society as a 
whole, and the welfare budget in particular.  It is with an eye to these wider social costs that – 
while recognising the costs and risks of regulation/legal intervention – we need to scrutinise 
carefully the circumstances in which the scale and scope of potentially adverse impacts 
justify these costs and risks, and support a moral argument that such costs and risks as must 
be borne are distributed equitably across the state, the market and the individual, rather than 
falling to the „self-responsibility‟ of the consumer.  This book argues that the differential 
impact of adverse outcomes on older owner is one such circumstance, not least because the 
„externalities‟ (for example, the requirement of financial support from family, friends or the 
state) are particularly evident.   
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The remaining chapters of this book focus in more detail on the nature and extent of legal 
interventions in the creation, content and consequences of housing equity transactions.  While 
it is necessary that any case for legal intervention in commercial activities must be „market-
specific‟329 – justified by reference to typical patterns of knowledge, skills, risks and costs 
between parties to a specific type of transaction – this chapter has identified some of the 
overarching and intersecting themes which cut across the different types of transaction by 
which older owners may seek to leverage their housing wealth.  There is also a wide 
spectrum of possible legal interventions, which apply at different stages of the transaction 
(creation, duration, enforcement), and with varying degrees along a spectrum running from 
minimal interference
330
 to bars against enforcement, and encompassing procedural and 
substantive, common law and regulatory initiatives.  Finally, the method utilised to access 
funds in retirement – from conventional secured and unsecured borrowing to bespoke equity 
release products – anchors the transaction in a particular legal context that shapes the 
underlying norms that will govern the relationship.  As the following chapters will 
demonstrate, these „default‟ norms are also significant in determining the likely success of 
arguments based in the concepts of vulnerability and responsibility.   
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